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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic management researchers have long dealt with the question of how 
executives affect organizational outcomes.  Much of this research has utilized one of two 
theoretical lenses (Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Hambrick, 2007; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).   
The first lens, upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), emphasizes the role of 
executives’ individual-based differences.  This view argues that the characteristics of an 
organization’s executives are related to their strategic choices (for reviews, see Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).  As such, 
research utilizing upper echelons theory has related executive demographic and 
personality characteristics to organizational outcomes.  The second line of research, much 
of which adopts an agency theory view (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
emphasizes the role of executives’ situational-based differences.  Accordingly, research 
employing agency theory has related executive compensation structures to the strategic 
initiatives of their organizations (for reviews, see Denis, 2001; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, 
& Yoder, 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  Although these perspectives differ in 
emphasis, scholars have noted that a “joint consideration of insights from each stream can 
enhance our understanding” of how executives affect organizational outcomes (Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004: 507).  With few exceptions (e.g. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; McLaughlin, 
 2
1991; Sanders, 2001), however, “almost no literature examines executive characteristics 
and compensation structures in tandem” (Hambrick, 2007: 339).  Because prior studies 
have not accounted for personal differences that may influence how individuals respond 
to varying forms of compensation, we lack understanding of how individual 
characteristics of executives and their compensation structures jointly determine the 
actions of their organizations.  This leads to the basic research question: “How do the 
individual characteristics of executives and the compensation structure under which they 
operate mutually affect organizational outcomes?”   
This dissertation argues that individual executive characteristics moderate the 
relationship between executive compensation and organizational outcomes.  Specifically, 
this dissertation analyzes the role that a chief executive officer’s (CEO) age, tenure in 
position, and overconfidence (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 
2008; Roll, 1986) play in moderating the relationship between the long-term pay 
structure of CEO compensation and strategic change.  The relationship is depicted in 
Figure 1.    
 
FIGURE 1 
Framework for Studying the Interaction of CEO Characteristics and Compensation 
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Theoretical Basis for Research 
 This dissertation combines concepts from upper echelons theory and agency 
theory to investigate strategic change.  The following section provides an overview of 
these three areas.  
Upper Echelons Theory 
As Hambrick (2007) notes, upper echelons theory is based upon two 
interconnected concepts: 
(1) that executives act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of 
the strategic situations they face, and  
(2) these personalized construals are a function of the executives’ 
experiences, values, and personalities (page 334).   
 
This logic is derived from the view that executives have limits in their ability to process 
information (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947).  While executives may be ‘intendedly 
rational,’ they are only limitedly so because they cannot assimilate all of the available 
information to arrive at a ‘perfectly rational’ decision (Simon, 1957).  Consequently, 
executive decisions are not completely objective, but rather, are affected by the 
individualized interpretation of information (Mischel, 1977).  Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) conceptualized upper echelons theory to explain organizational outcomes as a 
function of individual characteristics that affect how executives interpret, and 
subsequently act upon, information.  In accordance with the theory, upper echelons 
research has related a variety of executive experiences, values, and personality 
characteristics to organizational outcomes (for reveiws, see Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009).   
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 Beyond the two main premises of the theory, Hambrick (2007) notes “two 
subordinate ideas, each of which seems to have stimulated major streams of research” (p. 
334).  The first involves the level of analysis.  Researchers have analyzed both the effects 
of top management teams as a whole (e.g. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) as well as the CEO in isolation (e.g. 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sanders, 2001).  Because the 
management of an organization is a shared activity, studying the group of individuals (i.e. 
the top management team) that share in operating the organization “increases the 
potential strength of the theory to predict” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 196).  On the 
other hand, due to the disproportionate influence of the CEO (Mintzberg, 1978; Tushman 
& Romanelli, 1985), some scholars have investigated the top executive alone.   
While both approaches have added to our understanding of organizational 
outcomes, debate exists regarding the validity of aggregating the top management team 
(cf. Hambrick, 2007; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  Although this discussion is ongoing, 
scholars on both sides have acknowledged the predictive significance of utilizing only the 
CEO (Jensen & Zajac, 2004) because CEO’s “account for a considerable portion of the 
variance” in organizational outcomes that “remains unexplained by contextual 
considerations” (Hambrick, 2007: 341).  To avoid problems with aggregation of the top 
management team and to capitalize on the merits of analyzing the CEO alone, this 
dissertation investigates the characteristics of the CEO only.  Throughout this dissertation 
the term ‘executive,’ ‘manager,’ and ‘CEO’ are used interchangeably to describe the 
chief executive officer of an organization. 
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The second subordinate concept of upper echelons theory is that the 
“demographic characteristics of executives can be used as valid, albeit incomplete and 
imprecise, proxies of executives’ cognitive frames” (Hambrick, 2007: 335).  Early work 
in this view utilized demographic characteristics only (e.g. Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
D'Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Grimm & Smith, 1991).  This approach 
was taken for two reasons: first, “upper level managers are not convenient to measure or 
even amenable to direct measurement;” and second, certain demographic characteristics 
(e.g. tenure, age, education and functional background) “do not have close psychological 
analogs” but still affect decision making (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 196).   
Despite the merits of using demography, researchers have also assessed executive 
personality characteristics.  Some of this research has utilized direct, psychometric 
assessment (e.g. Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Miller & Droge, 1986; Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Wally & Baum, 1994).  In contrast to 
direct measurement, researchers have developed procedures to assess executive 
personality characteristics using unobtrusive measures (e.g. Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008).  These methods 
allow scholars to avoid problems with securing executive responses (e.g. low-response 
rates, non-response biases, and social desirability biases) while taking advantage of the 
benefits of ‘nonreactive’ measures (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966; Webb 
& Weick, 1979).  In this dissertation, demographic measures of age and tenure as CEO 
are utilized as well as unobtrusive measures of overconfidence.  Overconfidence is 
defined as the tendency to overestimate one’s own ability (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2008). 
 6
Agency Theory and Executive Compensation 
One avenue to investigate the influence of executive compensation has been 
through the lens of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Agency theory explains 
the problems that arise when ownership and control of the organization are divided 
between two parties, as is the case in the public corporation (Berle & Means, 1932).  As 
Mahoney (2005) notes,  
the separation of ownership and control produces a condition where the 
interests of the owner(s) and managers may, and often do, diverge and 
where many of the checks that formerly operated to limit the use of such 
discretionary managerial power disappear (page 143). 
 
Because the agent (i.e. executive) has control over the actions of the organization but 
does not bear the risks of failure directly, he or she faces incentives to pursue self-interest 
rather than the interest of the owners (i.e. shareholders).  When agents pursue self-
interest, owners may suffer an ‘agency loss’ unless they are able to align the incentives of 
the agent with their own (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
One way to align the incentives of the two parties is to structure the compensation 
of the executive so that it is tied to the value created for the owners (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990).  To accomplish this, owners can shift a greater proportion of the executive’s pay 
to long-term forms.  Long-term compensation serves to align the executive’s interest with 
those of the owners since his or her pay is directly linked to how the organization 
performs over time (Carpenter, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  
Thus, long-term compensation provides incentives for the executive to focus on long-
term organizational performance to maximize pay (Carpenter, 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998).   
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Long-term compensation is defined as the percentage of total compensation that is 
paid in long-term forms.  Forms of payment that are considered long-term are those that 
are based on future value, such as stock options, restricted stock grants, and long-term 
incentive plan (LTIP) payouts.  In contrast, short-term compensation is comprised of 
salary, benefits, and annual bonuses.  A compensation plan is said to be long-term when a 
greater percentage of total compensation (i.e. the sum of long-term and short-term 
compensation) is comprised of long-term components.  Structuring a CEO’s 
compensation in a long-term format not only aligns the interests of the CEO with those of 
the shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), but also induces the CEO to engage in risk-
taking (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and strategic change (Carpenter, 2000).  
Strategic Change 
As Hofer and Schendel (1978) note, to understand why organizations perform as 
they do, it is important to understand the “fundamental pattern of present and planned 
resource deployments” that constitutes the firm’s strategy (page 25).  Change to this 
pattern over time is defined as strategic change (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990).  Because of the “substantive importance of strategic change for 
organizational survival,” the concept “has been at the center of a growing literature in 
both the strategy and organizational theory fields” (Fiss & Zajac, 2006: 1173) for some 
time (e.g. Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Mintzberg, 1978; 
Rumelt, 1974).  One of the two primary research streams investigating strategic change 
focuses on the role of managers in the strategic change process (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 
1997).  This view is based on the notion that because executives are responsible for 
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initiating strategic change, it is essential to understand the role that they play (Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985).    
To investigate the role of executives in strategic change, scholars have employed 
both executive characteristics (e.g. Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and compensation 
structures (e.g. Carpenter, 2000; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  Because this research has 
yet to analyze the two in concert, it has “implicitly assumed that corporate elites’ effects” 
on strategic change depend only on their individual characteristics or their compensation, 
not the two in concert (Jensen & Zajac, 2004: 508).  As a result, the conclusions that have 
been drawn regarding executives initiation of strategic change have been incomplete 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997) because they have not considered the possibility that 
how individuals respond to various forms of compensation may differ based upon their 
personal characteristics.  By analyzing both executive characteristics and compensation 
in tandem, this dissertation hopes to gain a greater understanding of how executives may 
affect strategic change. 
Contributions of the Study 
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the strategic management literature in 
three ways.  First, to enhance our understanding of strategic change, several scholars have 
noted the necessity of utilizing multiple theoretical viewpoints in concert (e.g. Fiss & 
Zajac, 2006; Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen, & Suur-Inkeroinen, 2009; Zajac, Kraatz, 
& Bresser, 2000; Zhang, 2006).  By combining the insights gained from upper echelons 
and agency theories, this dissertation answers that call.  Doing so may advance our 
knowledge of executives’ role in strategic change by considering personal characteristics 
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that may affect how individuals respond to various forms of compensation.  Second, our 
knowledge of executive compensation may also be enhanced.  Prior research has been 
unable to find a consistent relationship between compensation structure and 
organizational outcomes (Devers et al., 2007).  By accounting for individual executive 
characteristics that may moderate this relationship, this study adds to our knowledge of 
how compensation structure is related to organizational outcomes.  A third and final 
contribution of this dissertation is to the practice of corporate governance.  By 
understanding how personal characteristics interact with compensation structure, this 
dissertation may help boards of directors devise more effective executive compensation 
plans.   
Dissertation Overview  
The remainder of this dissertation is dedicated to developing and evaluating these 
arguments in greater detail.  Chapter II is comprised of two parts: first, a literature review 
of upper echelons theory, agency theory, and strategic change is provided; and second, 
hypotheses are developed that build upon the literature review.  Chapter III discusses the 
research methodology to be used to test the hypotheses.  This includes information about 
the sample, the analytical techniques to be used, and the measures of constructs.  The 
results of the analysis are presented in Chapter IV.  Chapter V concludes the study with a 
discussion that provides implications of the results, evaluates the strengths and limitations 
of the dissertation, and suggests avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In this chapter, arguments are developed that combine elements from upper 
echelons and agency theories to assess their relationship with strategic change.  Prior to 
doing so, a review of upper echelons and agency theories as well as strategic change is 
provided.  Three components of the strategic change literature are covered: first, what 
strategic change is; second, the value of strategic change to the organization; and third, 
antecedents of strategic change.  Hypotheses development follows the literature review. 
An Overview of Upper Echelons Theory 
Upper echelons theory is one of the two most utilized viewpoints for investigating 
the effect that executives have on the strategic initiatives of their organizations (Canella 
& Monroe, 1997; Hambrick, 2007; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  This view stems from what 
researchers call the behavioral theory of the firm or the ‘Carnegie School’ (Bromiley, 
2005; Mahoney, 2005).  The Carnegie School argues that executive “decisions are largely 
the result of behavioral factors rather than perfectly rational analysis based upon 
complete information” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990: 485).  The logic of this view is 
that executives are confronted with large amounts of information that must be analyzed 
and then acted upon (Mintzberg, 1973).  Further, executives have limited personal 
resources (i.e. time, energy and cognitive capacity) with which to respond.  As such, they
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rely on their experiences, values, and personalities to filter the information to make it 
more manageable.  Because of the role that executives play in crafting organizational 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1978), those factors that affect how executives filter information to 
make decisions (i.e. their experiences, values, and personalities) will also have an effect 
on the actions of their organization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).   
Prior to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) presentation of upper echelons theory, 
scholars had been investigating the role that executive experiences, values, and 
personalities play in decision-making.  Among the first to do so were Dearborn and 
Simon (1958), who illustrated that managers’ functional backgrounds affected how they 
interpreted information.  Similarly, Hage and Dewar (1973) investigated the role that 
executives’ values play in decision-making while Miller and colleagues (Miller, 1983; 
Miller & Friesen, 1982; Miller, Kets de Vries, & Toulouse, 1982) noted the effects of 
executive personality characteristics on their organizations.  Building on these studies, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) presented upper echelons theory to explain organizational 
outcomes as a product of executive experiences, values, and personalities.  
Research utilizing upper echelons theory has related a number of executive 
demographic and personality characteristics to organizational outcomes (for recent 
reviews, see Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2009).  For example, Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) investigated top management team member age and tenure and found that 
organizations with older and longer tenured executives were less innovative.  Similarly, 
Smith and colleagues (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991) found that longer tenured 
top management teams were less likely to respond to competitive moves of rivals and 
Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) found that ROA was positively related to 
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having a CEO with international assignment experience.  Executive personality 
characteristics have also been analyzed.  For instance, Wally and Baum (1994) found that 
CEO tolerance for risk was positively related to the pace at which decisions were made 
while Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that CEO narcissism was positively related 
to strategic dynamism. 
An Overview of Agency Theory  
Like the upper echelons perspective, agency theory is also one of the two most 
utilized viewpoints for researching the impact that executives have on organizations’ 
strategic initiatives (Canella & Monroe, 1997; Hambrick, 2007; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).   
Agency theory builds on the insights of Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932), 
who noted the difference in interests between the individuals that own a firm (referred to 
either as owners or principals) and those that are hired to oversee its operation (referred 
to as either managers or agents).  Because the owner(s) and the manager(s) are both self-
interested, they want to maximize personal welfare.  As a result, “there is good reason to 
believe that” the managers “will not always act in the best interests of” the owners 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308).  When this occurs, the owners suffer what is known as 
‘residual loss’ because the owners’ overall welfare is decreased when the manager 
pursues self-interest rather than the interests of the owners.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
formulated agency theory to explain the occurrence of incentive differences between 
owners and managers and offer solutions to prevent the reduction of owner welfare.   
The existence of incentive differences between the owners and managers are 
compounded in three ways.  First, owners face ‘informational asymmetry’ because they 
do not know everything that the manager is doing or everything that the manager knows.  
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Further, the owner may not even be aware that residual loss is occurring, let alone its 
severity.  The owner can expend resources (i.e. time, energy and capital) to monitor the 
performance of the agent and reduce information asymmetry.  Because those resources 
could be allocated in another fashion if the owner was sure that the manager would act 
appropriately in the absence of monitoring, expending resources in this fashion reduces 
the owner’s welfare.   
Second, even if the owner does expend resources to monitor the agent, doing so 
may not reduce information asymmetry because monitoring the performance of agents is 
problematic (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  This is because the principal may not possess 
knowledge of the tasks the agent performs or because the tasks are inherently difficult to 
monitor.  In either case, the owner may be unable to recognize when the agent is acting 
inappropriately.  Additionally, the agent may act appropriately in the presence of the 
owner but act inappropriately when the owner’s attention is diverted.  This further 
confounds the owner’s ability to monitor the agent’s performance.  A potential solution 
would be for the owner to insist that the manager offer a bond (i.e. collateral in the form 
of assets or capital) that would be forfeited in the event that the manager acts 
inappropriately.  Because of informational asymmetry, even a bond may not prevent 
executives from engaging in self-interested actions since these individuals may be able to 
calculate the net return of a self-interested action, accounting for the loss of bond, and 
pursue only those actions that enhance welfare.  Further, the manager could eliminate or 
doctor evidence of inappropriate actions.  Doing so would create difficulty for the owners 
in proving inappropriate actions, thus preventing the payment of the bond.   
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Third, although a solution would be to create contracts that stipulate how the 
agent should act in all situations, the presence of bounded rationality (March & Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1947) prevents this.  Because the owners cannot foresee all contingencies 
that may occur, they cannot write a perfect contract.  For this reason, contracts may not 
be effective in preventing managerial self-interest.  The result is that the threat of 
managers pursuing self-interest is a persistent concern.  As Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
note: 
The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing 
the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.  It exists in all organizations and 
in all cooperative efforts – at every level of management in firms, in 
universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental 
authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified 
as agency relationships such as are common in the performing arts and the 
market for real estate (page 309). 
 
Since monitoring, bonding, and contracts may not be effective, owners must find 
other mechanisms to prevent reduced welfare that results from self-interested executive 
actions.  One method is to attempt to align the interests of the executive with those of the 
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  This may be accomplished by linking the 
compensation of the executive (which maximizes the executive’s welfare) directly to the 
value created for the owners (which maximizes the owner’s welfare).  Paying a greater 
proportion of the executive’s compensation in long-term forms is viewed as the primary 
way to align the interests of executives and shareholders (Devers et al., 2007) because 
when the executive pursues self-interest to maximize compensation, the welfare of the 
owner is also maximized (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).       
Research on whether long-term compensation helps to align the interests of 
executives with owners has produced equivocal results (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
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Mejia, 2000).  Mehran, Nogler and Schwartz (1998) found that incentive-based 
compensation was positively related to the voluntary enactment of liquidation policies 
that increased the value for owners, and similarly, Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) 
found that CEOs were more likely to disclose information voluntarily when paid in long-
term forms.  Conversely, some scholars have had opposite findings.  One way that 
executives may act self-interestedly is to disclose inaccurate information in company 
reports.  Both Burns and Kedia (2006) and O’Connor, Priem, Coombs and Gilley (2006) 
found a positive relationship between long-term compensation and inaccurate 
information disclosure, indicating that long-term compensation may not align incentives 
as theorized.   
One reason for equivocal findings may be that the relationship between executive 
compensation and organizational outcomes is moderated by factors that have yet to be 
considered (Denis, 2001).  Executive characteristics may be one such factor because 
individuals may differ in ways that affect how they respond to compensation 
(McLaughlin, 1991; Hambrick, 2007; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).  After reviewing the 
strategic change literature in the next section, hypotheses are developed that argue that 
executive age, tenure as CEO, and overconfidence affect the relationship between long-
term compensation structure and strategic change.  These hypotheses may offer some 
insight into why previous research has failed to find a consistent relationship between 
long-term compensation and organizational outcomes (Devers et al., 2007).   
Two Aspects of Strategic Change 
In this dissertation, strategic change is defined as alterations to an organization’s 
pattern of resource deployments over time (Hofer & Schendel, 1978).  This definition 
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encompasses various elements of strategic change in that an organization’s pattern of 
resource deployments may be altered relative to prior organizational patterns (Amburgey 
& Dacin, 1994; Amburgey & Miner, 1992) or relative to the resource allocations of 
competitors (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  Both 
conceptualizations are consistent with the definition that strategic change is alterations to 
an organization’s pattern of resource deployments.  Despite this consistency, the two 
notions differ with respect to referent: one aspect assesses strategic change relative to 
prior organizational patterns while the other assesses strategic change relative to patterns 
in the organization’s industry.  To distinguish whether change occurred relative to prior 
organizational levels or relative to competitors, it is necessary to delineate between these 
“two important aspects of strategic change” (Carpenter, 2000: 1181). 
The first aspect of strategic change is strategic variation.  Strategic variation is the 
tendency of an organization to alter patterns of resource deployments relative to prior 
organizational patterns.  Scholars have also utilized the term strategic persistence, or the 
“extent to which a firm’s strategy remains fixed over time” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990: 491) and strategic dynamism, or the “degree of change in an organization’s 
strategy” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, p. 358).  Regardless of terminology, all three 
compare the current resource allotments of the organization relative to prior levels.  The 
difference is that variation and dynamism measure change while persistence measures a 
lack of change.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the term strategic variation is used 
following the work of Carpenter (2000).   
The focus of strategic variation is internal to the organization in that it measures 
changes in patterns of the organization’s strategy but does not consider how the strategy 
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changed relative to competitors or the norms of the industry.  Strategic variation 
addresses the question of “do organizations stick to what they have done previously or do 
they alter courses of action to better match current contingencies?”  This aspect of 
strategic change provides evidence as to whether or not the organization remains 
committed to an organizational status quo (Boeker, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1993).   
The second aspect of strategic change is strategic deviation.  Strategic deviation is 
the change in the degree of conformity “of a firm’s resource commitments from industry 
norms of competition” (Carpenter, 2000: 1182).  Scholars have also labeled this strategic 
conformity (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997), strategic 
similarity (Deephouse, 1999; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001) and strategic 
homogeneity (Dooley, Fowler, & Miller, 1996; Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993).  
Regardless of terminology, each assesses the strategy of the focal organization relative to 
industry norms.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the term strategic deviation is used 
following the work of Carpenter (2000). Strategic deviation answers the question “do 
organizations stick to normative forms of competing or are they willing to attempt 
strategies that are new to their industry?”   This aspect of strategic change provides 
evidence as to whether or not the organization remains committed to the status quo of the 
industry (Boeker, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1993).   
The Value of Strategic Change to the Organization 
In the preceding section, two aspects of strategic change were outlined, strategic 
variation and strategic deviation.  Next, the question of “why organizations would initiate 
strategic change?” is addressed.  Initiation of strategic change is seen by some as a 
fundamental component of strategic management (Porter, 1996; Prahalad & Hamel, 
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1990) because maintaining “the status quo is equivalent to competitive surrender” 
(Carpenter, 2000: 1179).  In this view, altering strategies enables the organization to 
compete more favorably, thus creating a source of competitive advantage (Craig, 1996; 
Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998).  Three explanations may help to clarify why strategic 
change enables favorable competition and the subsequent creation of a competitive 
advantage.   
First, changing strategies allows organizations to differentiate themselves from 
competitors (Porter, 1980; White, 1986; Zajac & Shortell, 1989).  By differentiating, 
organizations are more able to take advantage of opportunities provided by, among other 
things, innovating, entering new markets, and economies of scope (Porter, 1985).  
Second, changing strategies allows organizations to better match their strategy to their 
situation (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).  Since environmental 
circumstances can change, altering strategies either in anticipation of, or in response to, 
these changes is often necessary (Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 1990; Mintzberg, 1990).  
Organizations that successfully adapt to changing environmental conditions can enhance 
survivability (Baum & Singh, 1994; Hannan & Freeman, 1977), more fully leverage core 
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and profit from a series of short-term 
competitive advantages to create a sustainable competitive advantage (D'Aveni, 1994).  
Further, organizations may have unique bundles of resources and altering strategies may 
enable them to better leverage these resources (Barney, 1991).  Third, as the dynamic 
view of strategy argues (e.g. Grant, 1996; Jacobson, 1992; Kirzner, 1979; Smith, Grimm, 
& Gannon, 1992), altering courses of action can create value by providing new 
opportunities (Jacobson, 1992; Schumpeter, 1942), gaining first-mover advantages 
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(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998) and establishing competitive footholds relative to 
rivals (Smith, Grimm & Gannon 1992).  Further, changing strategy can be a source of 
value by securing market share (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999), avoiding escalation of 
rivalries (Gimeno & Woo, 1996) and limiting competitors’ ability to counterattack 
(Miller & Chen, 1996).   
Antecedents of Strategic Change 
Given the viewpoint that strategic change can create value and be a source of 
competitive advantage, it is not surprising that a variety of antecedents to strategic change 
have been investigated (for a review, see Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  Boeker (1997) 
categorizes this literature on a continuum based upon whether the research adopts an 
inertial or adaptive view.  Using this continuum as a guide, the next section provides a 
review of strategic change.  Research adopting the inertial view is reviewed first, 
followed by investigations that adopt the adaptive view.   
Inertial View of Strategic Change 
 The inertial view of strategic change places emphasis on the “powerful forces” 
that “operate at both the firm and industry levels to discourage strategic change” 
(Carpenter, 2000: 1179).  Research that adopts this perspective investigates factors that 
limit the organization’s ability to initiate strategic change (e.g. Boeker, 1989; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  Along these lines, Porter (1980) argued that 
mobility barriers exist that prevent firms from changing strategies.  Although firms may 
recognize that a strategic change is needed, because they lack scale economies or 
required capital, strategic change may not be possible.  Similarly, the presence of 
switching costs and industry regulation may prohibit strategic change.  
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Beyond Porter’s framework, the environment of the firm has also been related to 
strategic change.  Much of this research has utilized institutional theory (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  The institutional theory argument is that 
organizations face pressures to conform to industry norms because conformity enhances 
their ability to survive (Scott, 1987).   Because of the pressure to conform, organizations 
are unlikely to deviate from industry norms of competition (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Some have questioned this argument, however (e.g. Delacroix, Swaminathan, & Solt, 
1989; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993).  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) argued that despite strong 
institutional pressures, colleges changed considerably from 1971 to 1986.  Building on 
these findings, Deephouse (1999) discussed that firms must “be as different as 
legitimately possible” (page 147) and pursue a ‘strategic balance’ between deviation and 
similarity.  That is, because firms benefit both by deviating from and conforming to 
industry norms, they must balance these benefits by changing strategies as much as 
possible while maintaining a connection to institutionalized practices.  This argument was 
supported by Kennedy and Fiss (2009), who found that while firms benefit from 
remaining linked to institutional norms they also benefit from pursuing new practices that 
are aimed at improving efficiency and performance.     
Other environmental factors that affect strategic change have been investigated as 
well, although findings have been equivocal (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  For 
instance, both dynamism and munificence (Dess & Beard, 1984) have been linked to 
strategic change with confounding results.  While Birnbaum (1984) and Wiersema and 
Bantel (1993) found a positive relationship between dynamism and strategic change, 
Fombrun and Ginsberg (1990) found a curvilinear relationship.  Similarly, with 
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munificence, some researchers have found a positive relationship with strategic change 
(e.g. Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) while others found a 
negative relationship (e.g. Zajac & Kraatz, 1993) or even no relationship (e.g. Goodstein 
& Boeker, 1991).  Further confounding the relationship between environment and 
strategic change, Birkinshaw, Morrison and Hulland (1995) found that while “structural 
determinants and competitive factors” in a firm’s industry do affect strategic change, the 
strength of relationships “vary considerably from one industry to another” (page 637).  
Along these lines, Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) offered a theoretical framework for 
investigating the technical, cultural and political aspects of an organization’s environment 
and whether these elements affect how organizations adapt and change practices.  
Although these arguments have yet to be established empirically, they offer insight into 
the relationship between environmental factors and strategic change. 
Research within the inertial perspective has also investigated the role that 
structure and prior strategy play in strategic change.  Building on Chandler’s (1962) 
argument that structure follows strategy, Frederickson and Iaquinto (1989) found that 
while strategy does determine structure, prior organizational structure creates a ‘path 
dependent’ process that affects strategic change.  That is, because the organization has a 
certain structure that cannot be altered easily (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), the adoption of 
one structure limits the ability to pursue certain strategies in the future (Amburgey & 
Dacin, 1994).  Prior strategies have also been linked to strategic change (e.g. Amburgey, 
Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Grimm, Corsi, & Smith, 1993; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Smith 
& Grimm, 1987).  Researchers have noted that firms that make large resource 
commitments toward one strategy may subsequently avoid changing that strategy 
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(Fombrun & Ginsberg, 1990).  This is because making a large outlay of resources toward 
one strategy leads the firm to justify the initial expenditure by avoiding change (Staw, 
1981).   
Like the effects of structure and prior strategy on strategic change, researchers 
have noted the role that prior performance plays as well.  Poor performance will elicit 
higher degrees of strategic change because the organization searches for new ways to 
meet aspiration levels while favorable performance will be an indicator that the firm may 
not need to change (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958).  Researchers have 
provided support for this contention, including Boeker (1989), Zajac and Kraatz (1993), 
Carpenter (2000) and Zhang (2006), each of which found a negative relationship between 
performance and strategic change.  Similarly, in a study of Finish grocery stores, 
Lamberg and colleagues (2009) found that firms that were performing well did not 
change strategies and Deephouse (1999) found that positive prior performance was 
negatively related to strategic change.  A potential confound in the relationship of 
organizational performance and strategic change is the amount of slack resources 
available to the firm (Pfeffer, 1978).  While organizations may want to initiate change in 
response to poor performance, if the organization does not have unabsorbed slack, or 
uncommitted liquid resources (Singh, 1986), it may be unable to do so (Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).       
Adaptive View of Strategic Change 
In contrast to the inertial view, the adaptive view of strategic change places 
emphasis on organizations proactively changing strategies (e.g. Eisenhardt & Brown, 
1998; Porter, 1996).  In this view, strategic change is initiated to match the strategy with 
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the unique contingencies of the organization such as resource endowments and the 
external environment (e.g. Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; 
Rumelt, 1974).  Adaptive view researchers have analyzed a number of organizational 
characteristics that affect strategic change, including firm age and size.  Arguments 
connecting strategic change with firm size and age stem from research on the nature of 
organizational growth and development (e.g. Chandler, 1962; Stinchcombe, 1965).  
While some research has found that firm size was positively related to strategic change 
(e.g. Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; Zajac et al., 2000), others have found that it was negatively 
related to strategic change (e.g. Carpenter, 2000; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Sanders, 
2001; Zhang, 2006).  Similarly, while Boeker (1989) found that firm age increased the 
likelihood of strategic change, Kelly and Amburgey (1991) found that firm age decreased 
the likelihood of strategic change.  Zajac and Kraatz (1993) offered an explanation for 
these findings, noting that the strategic change was dependent upon whether the firm 
needed to change or not, and not just upon size and age.   
 Scholars have argued that organizations are reliant upon the board of directors for 
strategic change decisions because the board of directors is responsible for overseeing the 
performance of executives (e.g. Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; McNulty & Pettigrew, 
1999; Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  As such, characteristics of the 
board of directors have been related to strategic change as well.  Hill and Snell (1988) 
found that board power was negatively related to the pursuit of change, although Golden 
and Zajac (2001) found that board power was positively related to strategic change, a 
finding consistent with Goodstein and Boeker’s (1991) results.  Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman (1989) argued that the board of direction serves as a source of information 
 24
for the organization.  Because directors have different sources of information, the 
composition of the board may be a determinant of organizational outcomes (Shropshire, 
2010).  Researchers have investigated this possibility by analyzing a variety of board 
member characteristics (e.g. Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Kor & Misangyi, 2008) including the 
structure of their social networks (Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Milton, 2000).  Westphal 
and Fredrickson (2001) found that board members experience on other boards was 
positive related to the strategic change while both Carpenter (2000) and Sanders (2001) 
found that a higher proportion of outsiders on the board related positively to strategic 
change.  In contrast, Zhang (2006) found no relationship between outside director 
percentage and strategic change, but did find a negative relationship between board size 
and strategic change; a finding that confirmed Goodstein and colleagues (1994) earlier 
work.   
Beyond the role of the board of directors, adaptive view researchers have also 
investigated the role that an organization’s executives play in strategic change.  
Executives hold a prominent position in the adaptive view because “only executive 
leadership has the position and potential to initiate and implement strategic change” 
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985: 209).  In particular, both age and tenure have been 
investigated because these traits are associated with executive rigidity (Katz, 1982), or a 
predisposition towards established practices (Boeker, 1997).  Executive rigidity may exist 
for two reasons.  First, cognitive biases may prevent executives from changing because 
the routines they established become entrenched over time.  Executives do not want to 
disrupt established practices or information processing procedures, and therefore, they 
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avoid change (Miller & Friesen, 1984).  Second, executives may lack motivation to 
change.  Miller (1991) argued that as executives age and/or remain in their positions for 
longer durations, they become “stale in the saddle” (page 34).  In turn, they continue with 
familiar courses of action because they grow complacent with the status quo and lack 
motivation to change.  Research findings have provided support for these two 
contentions, including both Grimm and Smith (1991) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992), 
who found that executive age and tenure were negatively related to strategic change.  
Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) as well as Boeker (1997) also found a 
negative relationship between strategic change and executive tenure.   
Beyond age and tenure, other demographic variables have been linked to strategic 
change as well.  Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) argued that because executives 
gained valuable information through their social network ties, these relationships may 
influence the propensity to initiate strategic change.  They found that the extra-industry 
network ties of executives were positively related to strategic change because these ties 
served as sources of new information.  In contrast, intra-industry network ties were 
negatively related to strategic change because these relationships created social pressures 
to conform to industry norms.  Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that executive 
education level had a positive relationship with strategic change and Zhang (2006) argued 
that the presence of a COO will affect strategic change initiatives, but that this 
relationship is dependent upon prior performance.  Findings suggest that the presence of a 
COO is positively related to strategic change when performance is low but that this 
relationship is the opposite when performance is high.  One possible explanation for this 
is that like the board of directors, the COO acts as a ‘check and balance’ to the CEO to 
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either initiate or limit strategic change depending on whether or not prior performance 
warrants the action.   
While scholars have relied heavily on demographic variables (Hambrick, 2007; 
Lawrence, 1997), some research has assessed the relationship between executive 
psychological traits and strategic change.  Three studies have linked executive locus of 
control with strategic change initiatives.  Miller and Toulouse (1986) found that 
executives with a more internal locus of control were more likely to adapt strategies to 
the environment.  Similarly, Govindarajan (1989) found that executives with a more 
internal locus of control were associated with higher degrees of strategic differentiation, 
results that were confirmed by Boone and colleagues (Boone, de Brabander, & van 
Witteloostuijn, 1996).  More recently, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that 
narcissistic CEOs were more likely to change strategies while Delgado-Garcia and de la 
Fuente-Sabate (2010) found that affective traits of CEOs impact the strategic change 
initiatives of their organizations.  Additionally, Hmieleski and Baron (2008) found that 
the regulatory foci (Higgins, 1997) of small business executives significantly related to 
deviation from intended strategies.  Those individuals with a prevention focus were 
negatively related to deviation from intended strategies while promotion focused 
executives were positively related to deviation from intended strategies.   
One psychological construct that has yet to be related to strategic change is 
overconfidence.  Overconfidence is a cognitive bias that affects how individuals respond 
to the situations that they face (Busenitz & Barney, 1997).  This bias is robust across 
situations (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995) and can persist in 
individuals for long periods of time regardless of previous outcomes (Kyle & Wang, 
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1997).  That is, overconfident individuals continue to exaggerate “their abilities and 
chances for success” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005: 302) even when prior performance or 
current conditions do not warrant it.  As a case in point, despite introducing products that 
“were less likely to achieve success,” overconfident managers expressed “extreme 
certainty about achieving success” (Simon & Houghton, 2003: 139).  
Because overconfident executives exaggerate their ability to exact value-creating 
changes (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), they may be more likely to initiate strategic change 
as well.  While researchers have yet to investigate this relationship, similar studies 
provide support for this contention.  Researchers have found that overconfident 
executives are more likely to take risks (Li & Tang, 2010), make acquisitions (Roll, 
1986) and undertake value-destroying mergers (Malmendier & Tate, 2008) in part 
because these individuals believe that their actions would result in positive gains for their 
firm (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).     
Summary of the Literature Review 
The purpose of this dissertation is to gain a greater understanding of the role that 
executives play in strategic change.  To this end, a review was provided of the two most 
utilized theoretical viewpoints for analyzing the role of executives in organizational 
outcomes: upper echelons and agency theories (Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Hambrick, 
2007; Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  Upper echelons theory emphasizes the effects of 
executive’s individual-based differences (for reviews, see Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009) while agency theory emphasizes their situational-based 
differences (for reviews, see Denis, 2001; Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997).  Accordingly, upper echelons research has related executive demographic and 
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personality traits to strategic change while agency theory has related the compensation 
situation under which executives work to strategic change.  
Three elements of strategic change were also reviewed.  First, two aspects of 
strategic change were discussed to more clearly delineate how the firm changed.  
Strategic variation refers to change relative to prior organizational strategies while 
strategic deviation refers to change relative to the strategies employed in the 
organizations’ industry.   Second, the merits of changing strategies were discussed.  
Strategic change can be valuable to organizations because it allows them to compete on 
more favorable terms, which in turn can be a source of competitive advantage (Eisenhardt 
& Brown, 1998; Craig, 1996).  Third, the antecedents of strategic change were reviewed.  
This review was organized according to whether the research adopted an ‘inertial’ or 
‘adaptive’ view (Boeker, 1997).   Although changing strategies may be beneficial, it may 
be difficult for an organization to do so because firms are often ‘inert’ (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984), or resistant to change.  However, because strategic change can be a 
source of competitive advantage, organizations often purposefully change or ‘adapt’ their 
strategies in an attempt to gain this competitive advantage (Porter, 1996).   
A problem that was highlighted in the review of strategic change is the presence 
of contradictory findings across a number of variables, an issue caused in part by 
researchers failing to incorporate the insights from multiple perspectives (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997).  Scholars have recently argued that combining the insights of various 
perspectives is needed to advance our knowledge of strategic change (e.g. Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Zajac et al., 2000; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).  Combining the insights of upper 
echelons and agencies theories has been advocated in this dissertation.  This approach 
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may be apt for three reasons. First, the perspectives share theoretical commonality in that 
both investigate the role of executives in organizational outcomes.  Second, although both 
upper echelons and agency perspectives have been utilized to investigate strategic change 
in isolation, they have yet to be used in concert.  Doing so may advance our knowledge 
of the role that executives play in initiating change.  Third, research relating executive 
compensation to organizational outcomes has produced contradictory results.  This 
suggests that while “pay does influence executive action,” the relationship may not be “in 
the simplistic manner prescribed” (Devers et al., 2007: 1032).  One reason for these 
contradictory findings may be the existence of unidentified moderators to the relationship 
between executive compensation and organizational outcomes (Denis, 2001).  A possible 
moderator may be executive characteristics because individual differences may affect 
how people respond to the compensation inducements they are presented (McLaughlin, 
1991; Hambrick, 2007; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).  As such, in the next section 
hypotheses are developed that argue that executive age, tenure as CEO, and 
overconfidence moderate the relationship between long-term compensation structure and 
strategic change. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
In this section, hypotheses are developed that argue that the relationship between 
executive compensation and strategic change is moderated by executive characteristics.  
Although it is also possible that this relationship could be reversed (i.e. that compensation 
situations would moderate the relationship between executive characteristics and strategic 
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change), the presence of contradictory findings between compensation and organizational 
outcomes suggests that this relationship is being affected by contextual considerations 
(Devers et al., 2007; Denis, 2001).  In contrast, the relationship between executive 
characteristics and strategic change has produced more consistent findings across a range 
of studies (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997), which suggests that the relationship is robust 
to situational differences such as executive compensation.  For these reasons, executive 
characteristics are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between long-term 
compensation structure and strategic change, and not vice versa.   
The hypotheses are developed as follows.  First, a direct relationship is 
hypothesized between the long-term structure of an executive’s compensation and 
strategic change.  Next, three executive characteristics are argued to affect the strength of 
this relationship: age, tenure and overconfidence.   
Executive Long-term Compensation Structure and Strategic Change 
Prior studies have noted that executives often avoid engaging in strategic change 
(e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Staw, 
1976).  The reluctance of executives to change strategies is problematic for the owners of 
the firm because strategic change can be a source of value for the organization 
(Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998; Craig, 1996).  When executives fail to pursue this value, the 
owners may suffer reduced welfare.  To avoid the reduction of welfare, owners of an 
organization must find methods to induce executives to engage in strategic change.  One 
way to persuade executive action is to align their interests with those of the owners 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Agency theory argues that aligning the interests of the 
executive with those of the owners can be accomplished by providing incentives to the 
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executive to pursue the interests of the owners.  These incentives can be provided by the 
structure of the executive’s compensation, because, as Jensen and Murphy (1990) note, 
“compensation policy that ties the CEO’s welfare to shareholder wealth helps align the” 
interests of the two parties and “thus provides incentives for CEOs to take appropriate 
actions” (page 226).   
The compensation policy believed to best align the interests of the executive with 
those of the owners is long-term compensation.  Long-term compensation helps align the 
incentives of the executive with those of the shareholder by paying the executive based 
upon the amount of value they have created for the owners (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  
That is, when shareholder value is increased, the compensation of the executive is 
likewise increased (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  Hence, long-term compensation 
provides incentives for executives to “focus their actions on long-term concerns” of the 
organization “like ongoing strategic change and adaptation” (Carpenter, 2000: 1184).   
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between CEO long-term 
compensation structure and strategic change.  
 
The Moderating Role of Executive Characteristics 
Some scholars have questioned whether long-term compensation induces 
managers to act as previously theorized (e.g. Hanlon, Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2003; Jensen, 
Murphy, & Wruck, 2004).   As Sanders (2001) notes, while long-term compensation may 
provide executives with incentives to act, various factors “could conceivably obscure the 
incentive effects” that long-term compensation offers (page 480).  One factor that may 
obscure, or alternately enhance, the incentive effects of long-term compensation is the 
characteristics of the executive.  That is, “executives might differ in their reactions to 
incentive arrangements” because individual “differences exist and are consequential” to 
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how executives respond to the situations that they face (Hambrick, 2007: 340).  As 
Hambrick notes, a 45-year-old executive may respond differently than a 65-year-old 
executive when faced with aggressive long-term incentive plans and similarly, executives 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds may respond differently when faced with the 
prospects of wealth.  Therefore, investigating the role that executive characteristic play in 
moderating the incentive effects of long-term compensation may be of promise.   
Executive Age and Tenure 
With regard to the relationship between long-term compensation and strategic 
change, executive age and tenure are important factors for two reasons.  First, the 
outcome of strategic change is uncertain, as it is not possible to determine beforehand 
what impact strategic change will have on the performance of the firm.  Outcome 
uncertainty increases executive risk because it threatens both job security and wealth 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Zwiebel, 1995).  The increased level of risk provides 
executives with disincentives to engage in long-term initiatives (Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 1996) such as strategic change.  This is particularly true for older 
executives, because the downside risks are increased disproportionately for these 
individuals since they have fewer years to recoup financial losses (Eaton & Rosen, 1983) 
and may have difficulty securing future employment (Ocasio, 1994).  Because of the 
higher downside risks, older executives may be less inclined than younger executives to 
respond to long-term compensation by engaging in strategic change.   
Second, implementing a strategic change requires executives to expend additional 
personal resources (i.e. time and energy) that they would not have to expend if they avoid 
strategic change (Boeker, 1989; Holmstrom, 1982).  Executives that are older and longer-
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tenured are less inclined to expend personal resources in this fashion (Miller, 1991).  As a 
result of the inclination against expending personal resources, older executives may be 
less likely to respond to the incentives that long-term compensation provides to initiate 
strategic change.  Cumulatively, because older and more tenured executives have both (a) 
higher downside risks associated with strategic change and (b) a predisposition against 
expending additional personal resources required to initiate change, these individuals 
may be less likely to respond to the incentives provided by long-term compensation with 
changing strategies.  Thus, executive age and tenure weaken the relationship between 
long-term compensation and strategic change. 
Hypothesis 2: CEO age will moderate the relationship between long-term compensation 
structure and strategic change such that as CEO age increases, the relationship between 
long-term compensation structure and strategic change is weakened. 
 
Hypothesis 3: CEO tenure will moderate the relationship between long-term 
compensation structure and strategic change such that as CEO tenure increases, the 
relationship between long-term compensation structure and strategic change is 
weakened.   
 
Executive Overconfidence 
Because overconfidence affects how individuals respond to the situations that 
they face (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), it may also be an important factor to consider in the 
context of executive compensation.  Overconfident individuals believe that their actions 
will result in successful outcomes (Malmendier & Tate, 2005).  Consequently, the 
incentive-effects of long-term compensation may be stronger for overconfident 
executives because these individuals are certain that their actions will result in favorable 
performance for their organization, which in turn will lead to higher compensation.  That 
is, because they are assured that outcomes will be favorable, overconfident executives 
will respond to long-term compensation more positively than their less confident 
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counterparts.  This is because the overconfident executive has little doubts about their 
ability to secure the outcome-based rewards that long-term compensation offers.  The 
relationship between long-term compensation and strategic change, then, will be stronger 
for overconfident executives because overconfident executives are positive that their 
initiation of strategic change will increase performance for the organization, which in 
turn will increase their compensation.   
Hypothesis 4: CEO overconfidence will moderate the relationship between long-term 
compensation and strategic change such that as CEO overconfidence increases, the 
relationship between long-term compensation structure and strategic change is 
strengthened.  
 
SUMMARY 
In the preceding chapter, a literature review was provided that expanded upon the 
research model provided in Chapter I.  This review included upper echelons and agency 
theories as well as three aspects of strategic change.  These three aspects covered what 
strategic change is, the value of strategic change to the organization, and antecedents of 
strategic change.  Subsequently, hypotheses were developed that combined elements 
from upper echelons and agency theories as they relate to strategic change, arguing that 
executive characteristics moderate the relationship between executive long-term 
compensation and strategic change.  Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized relationships, 
which are also listed in Table 1.    
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FIGURE 2 
Hypothesized Model of the Moderating Effects of CEO Characteristics on the 
Relationship between CEO Long-term Compensation Structure and Strategic Change 
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Table 1 
Hypotheses of the Moderating Effects of CEO Characteristics on the Relationship 
between CEO Long-term Compensation Structure and Strategic Change 
 
Hypothesis 1 
(positive) 
 
There will be a positive relationship between CEO long-
term compensation structure and strategic change.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
(negative) 
 
CEO age will moderate the relationship between long-
term compensation structure and strategic change such 
that as CEO age increases, the relationship between 
long-term compensation structure and strategic change is 
weakened. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
(negative) 
 
CEO tenure will moderate the relationship between 
long-term compensation structure and strategic change 
such that as CEO tenure increases, the relationship 
between long-term compensation structure and strategic 
change is weakened.   
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
(positive) 
 
CEO overconfidence will moderate the relationship 
between long-term compensation and strategic change 
such that as CEO overconfidence increases, the 
relationship between long-term compensation structure 
and strategic change is strengthened.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed to test the hypotheses that were 
developed in Chapter II.  Explanations are provided regarding the sample, the analytical 
techniques to be employed, and measures of the constructs.   
Sample 
 Because private corporations are not required to disclose compensation 
information, a sample of publicly traded firms operating in the United States from the 
years 1996 to 2006 was selected.  The year 1996 was chosen as a starting point for data 
collection to avoid discrepancies in the reporting of industry data that have been 
documented in years prior to 1996 (e.g. Guenther & Rosman, 1994; Kahle & Walkling, 
1996).  The year 2006 was chosen as an end point to avoid confounds associated with the 
global economic crisis that began in 2007.  The sample was further trimmed in four ways.  
First, firms operating in highly regulated industries (e.g. life insurance companies, 
financial institutions, professional sports organizations, utilities, governmentally owned 
corporations) were omitted because these firms may not be able to change strategies 
without governmental oversight (e.g. McGahan & Porter, 1997; Sanders, 2001).  Second, 
firms operating in industries with fewer than three competitors were omitted because it 
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is not possible to distinguish the effect that industry membership may have in these 
industries (McGahan & Porter, 1997).  Third, firms were omitted if their CEO held a 
temporary (e.g. Interim CEO, Acting CEO) or joint (e.g. co-CEO) appointment because 
the effect of these individuals on organizational outcomes may be different than a single, 
permanently appointed CEO (e.g. Ballinger & Marcel, 2010).  Fourth, to guard against 
the possibility that a firm was set up for the disposition of assets and does not have a 
strategy from which it can change, firms that reported less than four years of data in the 
period studied or with less than $100 million in sales and assets were omitted (e.g. 
McGahan & Porter, 1997; McNamara, Vaaler & Aime, 2005).   
No single data set exists that has all of the variables necessary for testing the 
hypothesized relationships while including appropriate control variables.  As such, data 
was gathered from a variety of sources.  Accounting statement data was gathered from 
the COMPUSTAT database and information on CEO compensation was gathered from 
COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp database.  Data on other executive and board of director 
characteristics was gathered from a various sources, including company 10-K statements, 
other databases such as Mergent and Compact Disclosure as well as The Dun & 
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management.   
Analytical Technique 
This data set has several characteristics that have led to the selection of the 
Arellano-Bond method (Arellano & Bond, 1991) to test the hypothesized relationships.  
The Arellano-Bond is “a statistical technique designed for analyzing autoregressive-
distributed lag models from panels with many cross-sectional units observed for 
relatively few time periods via General Method of Moments (GMM) estimates” (David, 
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Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006: 596).  This technique creates a model based upon a 
system of equations that includes one equation per time period.  The equations are 
different only in that the moments and instrumental variables are unique to each time 
period equation. 
The Arellano-Bond method has four characteristics that make it a good choice for 
testing the hypothesized relationships.  First, it controls for prior values of the dependent 
variables (i.e. it can control for values in time t when assessing a dependent variable in 
time t + 1 or can control for values in time t – 1 when assessing a dependent variable in 
time t).  This is important because strategic change is likely influenced in part by prior 
levels of strategic change.  Second, this method accounts for firm-specific fixed effects 
by subtracting the lagged values of regressors.  This practice is referred to as ‘first-
differencing’ and is advantageous because it removes unobserved latent heterogeneity 
from the model that may bias estimates if unaccounted for (Greene, 2008).  Firm-specific 
heterogeneity may exist in this sample because firms may differ over time in a consistent 
manner that is unobserved.  If the unobserved variables affect the dependent variable and 
are fixed over time, the parameter estimates may be biased.  To avoid biased estimates, it 
is necessary to account for these fixed effects.  Third, endogeneity may pose a problem 
because it is possible that long-term pay is at least partially driven by prior patterns of 
strategic change.  The “conventional way to deal with endogeneity is to include an 
instrumental variable” of the variable of interest (Hambrick, 2007: 338).  The Arellano-
Bond method does just this by “using lagged values of the regressors as instruments of 
the first-differenced regressors” (David et al., 2006: 596).  Fourth, improved estimates are 
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provided by GMM in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation that plague 
dynamic models (Greene, 2008).   
To ensure that this method is appropriate, two tests need to be conducted.  First, a 
Sargan/Hansen test checks for overidentification, which helps ensure the validity of the 
instrumental variables by testing whether they are uncorrelated with the residuals 
(Roodman, 2006).  Second, the Wald test checks for nested model comparisons by 
examining the significance of restrictions to a model in which the parameters are 
unrestricted (Greene, 2008).   
Temporal Measurement of Variables 
Prior to discussing the measures of the variables, it is important to note the time 
frames over which the variables were calculated.  All independent and control variables 
were measured in the focal time period t unless otherwise noted.  Dependent variables 
were calculated going forward (e.g. using t + 1).  This is equivalent to creating a lag 
variable for all independent variables (e.g. using t – 1) and assessing the dependent 
variable in time t, although rather than lagging all predictors, by calculating the ‘lag’ 
going forward, only the dependent variables are changed (Carpenter, 2000).    
When assessing relationships over time it can be difficult to know a priori the 
appropriate length of time to utilize (Sanders, 2001).  With regard to the hypothesized 
model, “CEO compensation should explain near-term changes in strategy, while 
controlling for alternative explanatory variables” (Carpenter, 2000: 1187).  However, 
there is no agreed upon time interval that constitutes ‘near-term’ when investigating 
relationships with strategic change.  Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) employed a pooled 
value of strategic change calculated over a five-year time, as did Zhang and Rajagopalan 
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(2003).  However, several prior studies have measured strategic change over three-year 
time periods (e.g. Boeker, 1997; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Greve, 1998; 
Haveman, 1993; Westphal et al., 2001; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) while other scholars 
have utilized a one-year time frame (e.g. Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Zajac et al., 
2000; Zhang, 2006).  Because there is not an agreed upon time interval for evaluating 
strategic change, multiple time frames were employed for this dissertation and results are 
compared to assess sensitivity across time intervals.  A one-year time frame (i.e. t + 1) 
was employed as well as a three-year time frame (i.e. t + 3).   
Measures 
Dependent Variables.  As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) note, “the most 
appropriate way to assess” the strategic change “is to examine actions on multiple fronts” 
(page 492).  Following this logic, strategic change was assessed using a composite 
measure.  Two composite measures were created, one to assess strategic variation and a 
second to assess strategic deviation.  The measure consisted of the following six 
indicators:  
1. advertising intensity (advertising/total sales) 
2. research and development (R&D) intensity (R&D/total sales) 
3. plant and equipment (P&E) upgrades (net P&E/gross P&E) 
4. non-production overhead (selling, general and administrative expense / sales) 
5. inventory levels (inventory/total sales) 
6. financial leverage (debt/equity) 
 
These indicators were used by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and have also been 
employed by other researchers to assess strategic change (e.g. Datta, Rajagopalan, & 
Zhang, 2003; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003, 2004).  The 
indicators were chosen because they have been utilized extensively in strategy research 
and because: 
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(a) they are potentially controllable by managers; (b) they may have an 
important effect on firm performance; (c) they are complementary, each 
focusing on an important but specific aspect of a firm’s strategic profile; 
and (d) they are amenable to data collection and have relatively reliable 
comparability across firms within an industry (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990: 491). 
 
Strategic variation measures the extent to which a firm’s strategy changes over 
time relative to prior firm strategies.  The strategic variation measure was calculated 
following a three-step process (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997).  First, for each of the six indicators, an absolute value of change is 
calculated between year t and the focal year (i.e. t +1 or t + 3). When using a one-year 
value, the difference is calculated between t and t + 1, which indicates change on this 
indicator over a single year.  When using the three-year value of strategic change, the 
change in each indicator is calculated by subtracting the value in t from the value in t + 3.  
Second, the values are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one.  Third, the standardized values of the six indicators are summed to form an index of 
strategic variation.  A higher index value represents a higher degree of strategic variation.  
The two strategic variation measures are referred to as ‘One-Year Strategic Variation,’ 
which is strategic variation using time t + 1, and ‘Three-Year Strategic Variation,’ which 
is strategic variation using time t + 3.   
 Strategic deviation measures the degree to which a firm’s strategy deviates from 
the norms of their industry.  Industry was assessed using the firm’s primary 4-digit SIC 
code.  Although some scholars have utilized 2-digit SIC codes (e.g. Westphal et al., 
2001), 4-digit SIC codes were chosen for this dissertation for two reasons.  First, 2-digit 
SIC codes classify firms in a very broad fashion which distorts industry effects 
(McGahan & Porter, 1997) and is problematic when identifying competitors (Fan & 
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Lang, 2000).  As a case in point, 2-digit SIC codes would indicate that plastic packaging 
manufacturers (e.g.  bubble-wrap, shrink-wrap, plastic containers) would be compared to 
pulp mills and similarly, that prescription drug companies would be compared to 
industrial fertilizer manufacturers, even though these industries have little, if any, 
competitive overlap (Fan & Lang, 2000).  Second, the 4-digit SIC is more commonly 
employed in the strategic change literature (e.g. Carpenter, 2000; Chatterjee & Hambrick; 
2007; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1990; Zhang, 2006; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009) which 
facilitates comparing the results of this dissertation to other studies.  Following this logic, 
4-digit SIC codes were used throughout this dissertation to identify the firm’s primary 
industry.   
The measure of strategic deviation utilizes the same six indicators as strategic 
variation and is calculated following a five-step process (e.g. Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  First, each of the six indicators is calculated in the 
focal time period (i.e. t +1 or t + 3) for both the firm and the firm’s primary industry.  
When using a single-year value, the value for year t + 1 is used.  When using the three-
year value of strategic change, the value is calculated for time period t + 3.  Second, the 
value of each indicator for the firm’s industry is subtracted from the firm value for each 
indicator.  Third, the absolute value of the differences calculated in step two is taken.  
Fourth, this value is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
Fifth, the six values from step four are summed to create a strategic deviation index for 
each firm.  A higher index value indicates a higher level of deviation from industry 
norms.   The two strategic deviation measures are referred to as ‘One-Year Strategic 
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Deviation,’ which is strategic deviation using time t + 1, and ‘Three-Year Strategic 
Deviation,’ which is strategic deviation using time t + 3.   
 Independent variables.  Long-term Compensation Structure (LTCS) is measured 
as the percentage of total CEO compensation paid in long-term forms (Carpenter, 2000).  
Long-term forms of compensation include restricted stock grants, option grants, and 
long-term incentive plan (LTIP) payouts.  Age is calculated as the age of the CEO in 
years during the focal year.  Tenure is calculated as the number of years the individual 
has been the CEO of the focal organization.    
Because there are limitations with unobtrusive measures of overconfidence (Hiller 
& Hambrick, 2005), the construct was assessed two ways and results compared across 
measures.  One method of measuring overconfidence utilizes the exercise of executive 
stock options (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008).  Stock options are a form of long-term 
compensation that provides the executive with the right to purchase company stock in the 
future at a pre-specified price.  The pre-specified price is referred to as the grant price.  
“Most executive options have a ten-year life span and are fully exercisable after a four-
year vesting period,” meaning that executives must hold the option for four years before 
it can be exercised and they must exercise it within six years after the option becomes 
exercisable (Malmendier & Tate, 2008: 24).  Options are non-tradable and cannot be 
short-sold.  As a result, options are almost always exercised immediately once they are 
vested (as long as they have a positive or ‘in-the-money’ value) because holding the 
exercisable options increases the executive’s risk (Ofek & Yermack, 2000).  As 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue, “one interpretation of failure to exercise is 
overconfidence,” because it implies that that the executive overestimates the value of the 
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“firm’s future returns” (page 24).  That is, executives hold onto the options to extract a 
higher value in the future because they are overconfident in their ability to drive the stock 
value higher.  In a recent field study, Hodge, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2009) provided 
support for this argument, noting that executives tend to overvalue stock options in part 
because they are “overly optimistic about the future prospects of their firms” (page 926).  
Following this logic, the current estimated value of each CEO’s exercisable stock-options 
that are unexercised was used to measure overconfidence.  This variable is denoted as 
Option-based Overconfidence.  Larger values indicate higher degrees of overconfidence.  
A second method of measuring overconfidence utilizes executives’ purchase and 
sale of company stock.  Despite the fact that doing so increases their “already high 
exposure to company risk,” executives may choose to purchase additional shares of 
company stock beyond what they receive in compensation (Malmendier & Tate, 2005: 
2672).  Because purchasing additional shares accentuates the risk of the executive (Ofek 
& Yermack, 2000), this action may serve as a proxy of overconfidence in that additional 
investment in their own company is a signal that the executive is confident in the future 
of the company.  Alternatively, executives may sell off current stock if they are not 
confident in the future prospects of the firm.  The net change in an executive’s stock 
ownership, excluding stock options and grants, was utilized as a measure of Stock-based 
Overconfidence.  Larger values reflect higher levels of confidence.   
 Moderating variables. Three interaction terms were created to assess the 
moderating role of age, tenure, and overconfidence on the relationship between long-term 
compensation and strategic change.  While scholars have suggested centering variables 
involved in interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991), the necessity of this practice in 
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econometric models has been questioned (Arellano, 2003; Greene, 2008).  As such, 
interactions were created by multiplying independent variables together without 
centering.  The result was three moderating variables: LTCS X Age, LTCS X Tenure, and 
LTCS X Overconfidence.    
Control Variables.  A variety of factors have been shown to affect strategic 
change.  It is important that these variables be controlled for to guard against the 
possibility that strategic change is being driven by these factors and not by the 
hypothesized relationship.  Because the industry in which an organization operates may 
affect its ability to change strategies (Porter, 1980), controlling for industry membership 
is necessary.  Industry is created using the 4-digit SIC code of each firm’s primary 
industry.  It has been argued that firm size directly affects strategic change (Mintzberg, 
1978).  Size was calculated as the natural log of total assets and included in the model.  
The availability of unabsorbed slack, or resources that are liquid but are not currently 
committed within the organization, enhances the organization’s ability to initiate actions 
(Singh, 1986; Staw et al., 1981) such as strategic change (e.g. Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007).  This is because the organization can more easily allocate uncommitted liquid 
resources since they do not have to make alterations in one area to have resources 
available for another.  Rather, having unabsorbed slack allows the organization to 
allocate uncommitted liquid resources to another project without having to reallocate 
resources from another area which can be difficult and costly (Singh, 1986).   As such, 
unabsorbed slack facilitates the implementation of strategic change (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007), it is important to include it as a control variable.  Unabsorbed slack 
was calculated as the current assets divided by current liabilities and included as a control 
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variable.  This ratio, also known as the current ratio, represents those resources within the 
organization that are liquid but are not absorbed by other projects (Singh, 1986).   
Wiersema and Bantel (1993) argued that prior levels of strategic change and 
performance are important determinants of strategic change.   That is, that strategic 
change in certain time period (e.g. time t + 1) is driven in part by strategic change in prior 
time period (e.g. time t).  The Arellano-Bond method is amenable to controlling for prior 
values of the dependent variable (Arellano, 2003) and so Prior Strategic Change was 
included as a control.  Consistent with the treatment of the dependent variables, prior 
strategic change is referred to as Prior One-Year Strategic Variation, Prior Three-Year 
Strategic Variation, Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation and Prior Three-Year Strategic 
Deviation, respectively.    
Prior firm performance was included as a control as well because firms that are 
performing well are less likely to initiate strategic change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993).  
Because of limitations in utilizing any one measure of firm performance (Venkatraman & 
Grant, 1986; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986), researchers (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) often employ both accounting-
based (e.g. ROA, ROI, ROE) and market-based measures of performance (e.g. Tobin’s q, 
total shareholder returns, market share).  This practice is beneficial because it provides 
evidence that the relationships are not sensitive to the measure of firm performance 
which helps enhance the robustness of the findings (Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Elenkov, 
2005).  Because of these benefits, the hypothesized relationships were tested using three 
different measures of prior firm performance and results are compared across measures.  
Two accounting-based measures and one market-based measure were utilized.     
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The first accounting-based measure that was employed is return on assets (ROA).  
ROA was selected because it “indicates the efficiency with which a firm employs its 
current asset base” (Carpenter et al., 2001: 500).  This is pertinent to the study of strategic 
change because if the organization is not currently employing assets efficiently, it may be 
more likely to change strategies.  An additional benefit of utilizing ROA is that “its 
frequent use in other studies” facilitates “comparing results across studies” (Sanders, 
2001: 483).   
One problem with utilizing ROA is that differences exist across industries 
(Hrebiniak & Snow, 1980; Porter, 1980) that limit comparability of accounting-based 
measures (Dess & Beard, 1984).  To guard against this possibility, it may be necessary to 
adjust these measures to account for industry variation (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998).  
One method of accounting for industry variation is utilizing Industry Adjusted ROA. This 
measure is calculated by taking the difference between the firm’s ROA and the median 
ROA from the firm’s primary industry (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 
2006).  Adjusting ROA to the industry median is preferable to mean-adjustments (e.g. 
mean difference, z-scores) for two reasons.  First, because panel data often exhibits non-
normality (i.e. skewness, multi-modality or kurtosis), adjusting by the mean may bias 
estimates since mean values do not adequately capture the distribution of non-normal 
data (Greene, 2008).  Second, using the median value facilitates comparison to the 
strategic change literature that commonly utilizes median adjusted measures (e.g. 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Zhang, 2006; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2009).   
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The third measure of firm performance that was utilized is the market-based 
measure of Total Shareholder Returns (TSR).  TSR is calculated as the percentage change 
in stock price plus the dividend yield.  This measure was chosen because it “is indicative 
of how effectively a firm is managing shareholder interests and the level at which it is 
providing shareholders an acceptable total stock market return” (Carpenter et al., 2001: 
500).  TSR may be relevant to this dissertation because if shareholder returns are low, 
these individuals may drive the organization to change strategies by electing change-
minded individuals to the board of the directors or inducing executives to act through ‘ex 
post settling up’ (Fama, 1980).  An added benefit of this measure is that it has been 
employed by other researchers (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Sanders 
& Hambrick, 2007), which facilitates the comparison of results across studies.   
More diversified firms may be more likely to undergo change (Markides, 1995).  
To control for the possibility of this effect, Diversification was controlled for using the 
entropy measure.  The entropy measure was chosen for two reasons.  First, research has 
shown that the entropy measure is preferred when an outcome may be sensitive to the 
effects of business portfolio composition (Robins & Wiersema, 2003).  Following these 
findings, the entropy measure was chosen because strategic change may be driven by the 
degree of diversification in a firm’s business portfolio.   Second, the measure is 
commonly employed, which facilitates comparison of results across studies.  The entropy 
measure is calculated as follows, where Pi is the percentage of total firm sales in the ith 
business unit and n is the firm’s number of business units: 
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Characteristics of the organization’s board of directors (BOD) have also been 
related to strategic change (e.g. Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Sanders, 2001; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994).  It is important, then, to control for these variables.  In 
particular, the composition and independence of the BOD have been related to strategic 
change (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  BOD Composition was calculated as the 
percentage of non-officer directors serving on the BOD (Carpenter, 2000).   BOD 
Independence was calculated using the ratio the outsiders (i.e. those individuals that are 
not current employees of the firm) to total board members (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).   
The ability of the CEO to enact change may be influenced by the position the 
CEO holds on the BOD (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  In particular, CEOs may have undue 
influence over the actions of the organization if they also serve as Chairman (a condition 
known as CEO Duality). CEO Duality was controlled for by adding a categorical variable 
with a value of one to the model if a CEO is also Chairman of the BOD, and a value of 
zero if the CEO is not the Chairman of the BOD.   
 It has also been argued that the existence of blockholders may inhibit the ability 
of the CEO to initiate change (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  To control for this possibility, 
Blockholder Ownership was included in the model.  Blockholder ownership was 
calculated as a percentage of the organization’s stock that is owned by individuals who 
own greater than 5 percent of the company’s stock.  Because the CEO may also be a 
blockholder, which enhances the ability to initiate change, this was controlled for. CEO 
Ownership was calculated as the percentage of stock in the company that the CEO owns.  
To help isolate the effects of long-term compensation, it is important to control for higher 
levels of annual compensation not tied to long-term forms, because annual compensation 
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may also affect a CEO’s propensity to implement changes (Carpenter, 2000).  Annual 
Compensation was calculated as the total value of all compensation not paid in long-term 
forms (e.g. cash, bonus, and other forms of annual compensation).   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of statistical analysis used to test the hypotheses 
that were outlined in Chapter II.  The results are presented in five sections.  First, 
information about the data collection process is provided.  Second, descriptive statistics 
and correlations are reported.  Third, the underlying properties of the data are tested to 
determine the appropriate analytical technique to utilize.  Fourth, the results of the 
hypotheses testing are reported across two different conceptualizations of strategic 
change (i.e. strategic variation and strategic deviation) and time periods (i.e. one-year, 
three-years) as discussed in Chapter III.  Fifth, post-hoc analysis was conducted.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.     
Sample Description 
The target sample was defined in Chapter III as publicly traded corporations 
operating in the United States from 1996 through 2006.  The target sample was further 
identified as having the following four characteristics.  First, firms operating in heavily 
regulated industries were omitted because these firms may not be able to alter their 
strategies without the consent of the government (e.g. McGahan & Porter, 1997; Sanders, 
2001).  Second, firms operating in industries with less than three competitors were 
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omitted since it is not possible to distinguish to what extent industry membership effects 
the strategic decisions of these firms (e.g. McGahan & Porter, 1997).   Third, firms with a 
CEO that held a temporary or joint appointment were omitted because the effect that 
these individuals have on the strategic initiatives of their organizations may be different 
than a CEO who is permanently and solely appointed (e.g. Ballinger & Marcel, 2010).  
Fourth, firms with less than $100 million in assets and sales and those with less than four 
years of data reported were omitted to guard against the possibility that these were set up 
solely for the disposition of assets and as such, lack a strategy from which to change (e.g. 
McGahan & Porter 1997; McNamara et al., 2005).   A total of 914 firms met the sample 
definition.   
Data was collected on each of the firms over the sampling time-frame of 1996 to 
2006.   Multiple data sources were utilized since no single data source contained all of the 
variables necessary to test the hypothesized relationships.  Financial statement data was 
gathered from the COMPUSTAT database while data on CEOs was gathered from 
COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp database.  Data on other executive and board of director 
characteristics was gathered from a variety of sources, including the Mergent and 
RiskMetrics databases as well as The Dun & Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate 
Management.   
Because outliers have the potential to bias results, Hair and colleagues (Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006) recommend testing for the presence of 
influential values prior to analysis.  The presence of outliers is problematic for at least 
two reasons (Whitley, 2001).  First, outliers can distort statistical analysis because 
extreme values can bias estimates towards the outlying observations.  Second, outliers 
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may not be representative of the population of interest, a fact that hinders the ability to 
generalize findings.  A common threshold for identifying outliers is using values in 
excess of three standard deviations away from the mean (McNamara et al., 2005).  
Following this threshold, outlying firm-year observations were identified using 
studentized residuals and removed one at a time (Hair et al., 2006).  Analysis was re-run 
after each removal until no values exceeded the three standard deviation threshold.  A 
total of thirty-two observations were removed, resulting in a final sample of 6,957 
observations across 914 firms.   
As prior researchers have noted (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Westphal et al., 2001), not all firms either incur or report expenses on 
each of the six indicators of strategic change.  This can be problematic in calculating 
strategic change because several firms may have missing observations on at least one of 
the six indicators.  In this study, only 617 firm-year observations across 165 firms did not 
have missing data on one of the six indicators of strategic change.   As a result, 6,340 
firm-year observations would need to be dropped from the sample if all six indicators of 
strategic change were utilized.  Because removing that many observations would 
compromise power (Cohen, 1992; Hair et al., 2006), an alternative measure of strategic 
change utilizing only four of the indicators was employed (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).   
The alternative measure is calculated in the same fashion as the original measure 
with the exception that two indicators with the most missing data, research and 
development expenses and advertising expenses, are removed (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990).  The original measure with six indicators and the alternative measure with four 
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indicators exhibited significant positive correlations (p < .001) across each of the four 
dependent variables discussed in Chapter III (i.e. one- and three-year strategic variation, 
one- and three-year strategic deviation).  This finding, presented in Table 2, provides 
support for the use of the alternative four-indicator measure as a reasonable substitute for 
the original six-indicator measure (Hair et al., 2006; Whitley, 2001).   
Table 2 
Correlations between Original and Alternative Measures of Strategic Change 
Measure r 
One-Year Strategic Variation 0.8548 
Three-Year Strategic Variation 0.8396 
One-Year Strategic Deviation 0.9993 
Three-Year Strategic Deviation 0.9995 
All correlations significant at p < .001.    
 Two additional factors further reduced the sample size.  First, additional 
observations were lost as a result of firms failing to report data on all four indicators.  
Although the alternative measure using only four indicators helps reduce the potential for 
unreported data since firms only have to report four indicators rather than six, some firms 
still did not report all four indicators.  As a result, these firms had to be removed from the 
sample because it is not possible to calculate the dependent variable if data is missing 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  Second, firms may not report the same indicators over 
time.  This fact affects the ability to calculate strategic change.  For example, if a firm 
reports an indicator in year t but not in year t + 1 or in year t + 3, it is not possible to 
determine to what extent the indicator changed over the respective time frame.  As such, 
additional observations were lost when firms did not report indicators consistently over 
time.  The number of firms that did not report indicators consistently was different 
between the two time periods utilized (i.e. one-year and three-year).  More firms did not 
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report indicators consistently over three years than over a single year.  As such, the final 
sample contains more observations when one-year values are utilized to calculate the 
dependent variable than when three-year values were utilized.  The final sample consisted 
of 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms for one-year strategic variation and one-
year deviation and 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms for three-year strategic 
variation and three-year deviation.   
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3 and a correlation matrix is presented 
in Table 4.  Four items are worth noting from the correlation matrix.   First, none of the 
focal variables (i.e. long-term compensation structure, age, tenure, option-based 
overconfidence, stock-based overconfidence) correlate significantly with any of the four 
dependent variables.  A lack of correlation between variables in a hypothesized 
relationship indicates that these variables are not directly related to each other (Hair et al., 
2006).  However, correlational analysis is not sufficient when analyzing whether one 
variable affects another, particularly over time (Pearson, Lee & Elderton, 1910; Yule, 
1906).  Rather, correlations are valid for use only in determining association between 
variables; additional analysis using more advanced techniques should be utilized to 
determine whether one variable affects another (Yule, 1926).   The results of analysis 
using more advanced techniques are discussed in the next section.  Second, the two 
measures of overconfidence (option-based and stock-based) do not correlate significantly.  
This is worth noting because a lack of correlation between the two measures of the same 
construct indicates that one or both of the measures may not adequately assess 
overconfidence since two measures of the same construct should correlate (Hair et al., 
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2006).  Third, the three measures of firm performance (Industry Adjusted ROA, ROA, 
and TSR) are significantly correlated, so tests are likely to be consistent across the three 
variables (Whitley, 2001).   Fourth, three of the four dependent variables (all except 
three-year strategic deviation) are significantly correlated with their prior values.  This is 
useful as a visual check for autocorrelation and indicates that additional tests of 
autocorrelation should be conducted (Hair et al., 2006).  The results of the additional tests 
and a more thorough explanation of autocorrelation are provided in the next section.  
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Mean SD 
One-Year Strategic Variation -1.05 1.35 
Prior One-Year Strategic Variation -1.07 1.32 
Three-Year Strategic Variation -1.06 1.38 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Variation -1.10 1.34 
One-Year Strategic Deviation 5.20 21.67 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation 5.01 18.53 
Three-Year Strategic Deviation 4.62 19.24 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.43 27.80 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 0.51 0.28 
Tenure 7.22 6.43 
Age 55.59 6.87 
Option-based Overconfidence 9698.8 23118.1 
Stock-based Overconfidence 1.53 4.15 
Size 7.59 1.43 
Unabsorbed Slack 2.09 1.61 
Industry Adjusted ROA 0.04 0.09 
ROA 0.05 0.09 
TSR 14.12 40.35 
Diversification 0.55 0.55 
BOD Composition 0.2 0.11 
BOD Independence 0.67 0.17 
CEO Duality 0.66 0.47 
Blockholder Ownership 16.84 29.15 
CEO Ownership 1.96 5.76 
Annual Compensation 1473.2 1466.98 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 One-Year SV 
  
                                              
2 Prior One-Year SV  .37                                               
3 Three-Year SV  .51 .33                                             
4 Prior Three-Year SV  .32 .52 .32                                           
5 One-Year SD  .02 .01 -.02 .01                                         
6 Prior One-Year SD  .01 .01 -.01 .02 .07                                       
7 Three-Year SD  .02 .01 .02 .00 .03 .02                                     
8 Prior Three-Year SD  .01 .01 -.01 .02 .07 .99 .02                                   
9 Long-Term Compensation Structure .01 .02 .00 .00 .00 -.01 .01 -.01                                 
10 Tenure -.01 -.03 .00 -.04 .00 .00 -.01 .00 -.18                               
11 Age -.01 -.02 .02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.14 .43                             
12 Option-based Overconfidence -.02 -.02 -.04 -.02 .05 .04 .01 .04 .13 .08 .02                           
13 Stock-based Overconfidence .00 .01 .05 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 -.02 -.01 -.03 .00                         
14 Size -.04 -.02 .00 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 .29 -.12 .08 .18 .00                       
15 Unabsorbed Slack .01 -.02 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 .15 -.02 .01 -.01 -.36                     
16 Industry Adjusted ROA -.13 -.13 -.16 -.11 -.01 -.06 .01 -.06 -.03 .06 .05 .08 -.01 -.01 .01                   
17 ROA -.13 -.14 -.15 -.12 .00 -.05 .01 -.05 -.04 .07 .05 .07 -.01 -.02 .02 .93                 
18 TSR -.05 .01 -.07 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 .01 .03 -.02 .21 -.01 -.02 .09 .14 .15               
19 Diversification .01 .00 .02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.01 .05 -.05 .10 .01 .02 .28 -.15 -.07 -.07 -.04             
20 BOD Composition -.02 -.03 -.01 -.01 .02 .02 .02 .02 -.20 .26 .04 .00 .00 -.26 .14 .05 .06 .02 -.17           
21 BOD Independence .02 .01 .01 .00 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.03 .18 -.19 -.01 .00 -.02 .20 -.07 -.03 -.04 -.02 .16 -.61         
22 CEO Duality .02 -.01 .03 -.01 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .00 .26 .28 .06 .00 .18 -.08 .02 .02 .00 .08 -.09 .13       
23 Blockholder Ownership -.02 -.01 .02 -.01 .06 .07 -.02 .07 .05 -.01 -.04 .03 -.01 -.03 .02 -.03 -.02 -.02 .04 .07 -.05 .02     
24 CEO Ownership .02 .02 .04 .02 .00 .01 .00 .01 -.25 .41 .13 .01 .10 -.21 .10 .06 .06 .03 -.07 .32 -.26 .12 .00   
25 Annual Compensation -.04 -.01 -.06 -.02 -.02 .01 -.02 .01 .07 .02 .12 .20 .00 .49 -.16 .10 .08 .06 .15 -.10 .07 .16 -.04 -.08 
  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.  Strategic Variation is abbreviated SV and Strategic Deviation is abbreviated SD.     
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Underlying Properties of the Data 
Following the analysis of the correlation matrices, the underlying properties of the 
data were assessed.   It is necessary to assess the underlying properties of the data for two 
reasons (Hair et al., 2006).  First, this helps to identify problems present in the dataset 
that must be accounted for in analyses.  Second, without understanding the underlying 
properties of the dataset, one cannot know if a particular analytical technique is 
appropriate to use in conjunction with those properties.  Certo and Semadeni (2006) 
suggest four properties that must be assessed in longitudinal analysis.  Following this 
recommendation, the following four properties were assessed: heteroskedasticity, firm-
specific heterogeneity (which is also referred to as the presence of ‘fixed effects’), 
autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation.  Hair and colleagues (2006) 
recommend assessing whether multicollinearity is present whenever more than two 
variables are included in analyses.  As such, multicollinearity was also assessed.  
Additional information on each of these properties and their tests is provided in this 
section.  Tests were conducted on each of the four dependent variables (i.e. one- and 
three-year strategic variation; one- and three-year strategic deviation).   
Heteroskedasticity 
 Heteroskedasticity occurs when errors terms do not exhibit constant variance.   
The unequal variance can bias estimates of standard error unless they are corrected 
(Greene, 2008; White, 1980).  This occurs because the formula used to derive the 
standard errors relies on the assumption that error terms are constant across all 
observations.  If this assumption is not true, it is not possible to accurately estimate the 
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standard error unless an adjustment is made to the formula that corrects for this problem 
(Greene, 2008; White, 1980).   
The Breusch-Pagan test was utilized to assess whether heteroskedasticity was 
present.  This test assesses a null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is equal.   
Results rejected the null hypotheses (p < 0.001), which indicates that heteroskedasticity 
was present for each of the four dependent variables.   To correct for heteroskedasticity, 
robust standard errors (White, 1980) were utilized.  The calculation of robust standard 
errors does not rely on the assumption that variance is constant.  As a result, more 
consistent and valid estimates of the standard error are produced (Greene, 2008).    
Firm-Specific Heterogeneity 
Firm-specific heterogeneity refers to the possibility that firms differ in a 
consistent fashion.  If the manner in which the firms differ affects the dependent variable 
but is not accounted for in the analyses (e.g. it is unknown, unobservable, or omitted due 
to oversight), estimates can be biased (Certo & Semadeni, 2006; Greene, 2008).  That is, 
failure to include a variable in which the firms differ as a predictor can bias estimates if 
that variable affects the dependent variable.  Firm-specific heterogeneity may exist in this 
sample because firms can differ in ways that affect their strategic change initiatives but 
that is unknown or unobserved.    
Incorporating firm-specific fixed effects in analyses can help account for firm-
specific differences that are constant across time and are otherwise not included as 
predictor variables (Bowen & Wiersema, 1999; Hitt, Gimeno & Hoskisson, 1998).  This 
is done by creating a unique predictor for each firm and including this firm-specific 
predictor (known as a ‘fixed effect’) in calculation of the estimates (Greene, 2008).  To 
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determine if firm-specific fixed effects should be included, Hausman tests were 
conducted.  Hausman tests assess a null hypothesis that adding fixed effects does not 
improve the fit of the model versus the alternative hypotheses that adding fixed effects 
significantly improves the model.  Results indicated that fixed effects estimations were 
appropriate, as is indicated by a rejection of the null hypotheses (p < 0.001).  As a result, 
fixed effects were utilized in all analyses.   
Contemporaneous Correlation 
As Beck and Katz (1995) note, contemporaneous correlation exists when error 
terms are correlated within a time period but not across time periods (i.e. errors at time t 
are correlated with each other but the errors at time t are not correlated with errors at 
other time periods such as t – 1 or t + 1).  Contemporaneous correlation is endemic to 
longitudinal analysis since unique ‘events’ can occur within a time period that affect a 
high percentage of the sample within that time period in a similar fashion (Beck & Katz, 
1995; Certo & Semadeni, 2006).  The adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an example 
of such an ‘event’ since the uncertainty with respect to how the act would affect large, 
publicly-held firms may have affected a high percentage of the sample in 2002.  If these 
events affect the dependent variable and are not accounted for in the analyses, estimates 
can be biased.  This is because analyses is not factoring in the effect of the event on the 
dependent variable in a given time period.   
To account for contemporaneous correlation, scholars (e.g. Beck & Katz, 1995; 
Certo & Semadeni, 2006) have recommended using ‘time dummy’ variables.  Time 
dummy variables are unique binary indicators added for each time period in the sample.  
The variable is assigned a value of 1 if a firm-year observation equals the period of the 
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time dummy and a value of 0 if not.  Adding time dummies helps account for the 
possibility that events unique to certain time periods may affect the occurrence of the 
dependent variable.   
Since data was collected on a yearly basis, time dummies were assigned for each 
year in the sample.  For example, all observations in the year 2000 would have a value of 
1 in the time dummy ‘2000’ and a value of 0 in all other time dummy years (i.e. 1996-
1999; 2001-2006).  To avoid multicollinearity, the first year in the sample (i.e. 1996) was 
not assigned a time dummy since a value of zero in all other years is equivalent to a value 
of 1 in 1996.  A significant change in F (p < .05) in the presence of time dummies 
supported the inclusion of time dummy variables.  This indicates the inclusion of time 
dummy variables significantly improves the fit of the model.  For clarity in the 
presentation of results, time dummies are omitted from all tables (Certo & Semadeni, 
2006).   
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation occurs when a firm-year observation is correlated with other 
firm-year observations of the same variable.  The presence of autocorrelation can lead to 
biased estimates if unaccounted for (Greene, 2008).  This occurs because the calculations 
used to derive the estimates assume that these variables are independently and randomly 
distributed and thus, are not systematically correlated (Certo & Semadeni, 2006).  
However, if this assumption is not true, the estimates of the standard error will be biased 
unless an adjustment is made to the derivations to account for this correlation (Greene, 
2008).  A Baltagi-Wu test was conducted to diagnose whether observations were 
autocorrelated across time periods.  This test analyzes whether the errors are correlated 
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across time periods as indicated by values below 2.0 (Baltagi & Wu, 1999).  Results 
indicated that autocorrelation was present when three-year strategic variation was the 
dependent variable (< 1.50), but not when one-year strategic variation or either one- or 
three-year strategic deviation were assessed (values > 2.0).  Accordingly, autocorrelation 
must be accounted for in the estimation of models where three-year strategic variation is 
the dependent variable.   
Since significant autocorrleation is not present in three of the models (i.e. when 
the dependent variable is one-year strategic or one- or three-year strategic deviation), 
utilizing GMM is not appropriate because instrumenting to remove autocorrelation is less 
efficient in this scenario and may lead to inconsistent estimates (Roodman, 2006).  As 
such, fixed effects regression with robust standard errors was selected for analysis in 
which autocorrelation was not present.  For longitudinal analysis in which fixed effects, 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation are present, researchers (e.g. Certo & 
Semadeni, 2006; Beck & Katz, 1995) have recommended the use of this technique over 
others (e.g. ordinary least squares; generalized least squares), particularly when the 
number of time periods (t) is less than the number of observations (n) as is the case in this 
study.  This is because both ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimates can lead to biased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation, a fact that is accentuated in longitudinal data where t is less 
than n.  Accordingly, fixed effects regression with robust standard errors was employed 
for all analyses other than when three-year strategic variation is the dependent variable.   
For analyses in which three-year strategic variation is the dependent variable, a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) with robust standard errors employing the 
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Arellano-Bond (Arellano & Bond, 1991) difference method was utilized as was discussed 
in Chapter III.   
Multicollinearity 
  Multicollinearity occurs when an independent variable is highly correlated with 
other independent variables or sets of independent variables (Hair et al., 2006).  Because 
multicollinear variables are so highly associated with each other, they do not have an 
‘independent’ or ‘unique’ effect on the dependent variable but rather, their effect is 
‘shared.’  As a result, including multicollinear variables can bias estimates unless they are 
removed because the effect that is ‘shared’ by the multicollinear variables is included 
more than once in the derivation of estimates (Greene, 2008).  To assess whether 
multicollinearity was present in the hypothesized models, a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was calculated (Hair et al., 2006).  VIF values compare the estimates obtained by 
including a certain variable with estimates that would be obtained if a correlation is 
constrained to zero.  Although there is no test to determine if the estimates are biased by 
the inclusion of collinear variables, VIF values higher than 10 are a common rule of 
thumb (Hair et al., 2006).  VIF values higher than 10 indicate that estimates of the 
standard error are at least ten percent higher when the variable is included, and thus are 
less accurate.  As a result, removing the variable will improve the accuracy of estimates. 
Two variables exceeded the threshold value of 10 (Hair et al., 2006).  First, 
diversification exceeded the level of VIF when three-year strategic variation was the 
dependent variable.  Because of this result, diversification was omitted from analyses in 
which three-year strategic variation is the dependent variable.  Second, VIF values above 
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10 were found for industry on all four dependent variables.  As such, industry was 
removed from all analyses.   
Hypothesis Tests 
 Now that the underlying properties of the data have been determined and the 
analytic techniques selected, the next step is to test the relationships that were 
hypothesized in Chapter II.  The results of all hypotheses tests are presented in this 
section.  As a review, long-term compensation structure was posited to be positively 
related to strategic change (Hypothesis 1) while executive age (Hypothesis 2) and tenure 
(Hypothesis 3) were hypothesized to weaken this relationship and overconfidence 
(Hypothesis 4) was hypothesized to strengthen this relationship.  To test the robustness of 
the hypotheses to concerns associated with the measurement of strategic change, firm 
performance and overconfidence, multiple measurements of these variables were 
employed.  These included:   
1. Utilizing two measures of strategic change (strategic variation and 
strategic deviation) to capture change relative to different referents.  
2. Employing two time intervals (one-year and three-years) since there is not 
an agreed upon duration for evaluating strategic change.  
3. Applying two measures of overconfidence (option-based and stock-based) 
to attenuate concerns related to the validity of indirect measures of this 
construct. 
4. Assessing firm performance in three ways (ROA, Industry Adjusted ROA, 
and TSR) to account for limitations of any single measure of performance.   
 
These four measurement adjustments were included in tests of each hypothesized 
relationship.  To facilitate organization of the analysis, all results relative to one 
dependent variable are discussed prior to moving to the next dependent variable.  After 
each of the dependent variables is presented, a summary of the results of hypotheses 
testing is provided.   
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Organization of the Hypothesis Tests 
Tests employing fixed effects regressions are presented first, followed by tests 
using GMM.  Fixed effects regressions with robust standard errors were conducted in 
four steps.  First, a ‘control model’ was run that included only the control variables 
(Model 1).  Second, the main effect of long-term compensation structure was added to the 
first model (Model 2).  Third, separate models were run that added a single moderator 
(i.e. age, tenure, option-based overconfidence, stock-based overconfidence) to the second 
model (Models 3 through 6).  Fourth, ‘full’ models (Models 7 and 8) were run that 
included the three hypothesized moderators of age, tenure and overconfidence in the 
same model (one model for option-based overconfidence and one for stock-based 
overconfidence).  Results of tests on one-year strategic variation are presented in Tables 
5, 6 and 7 while tests on one-year strategic deviation are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10 
and tests on three-year strategic deviation are presented in Tables 11, 12 and 13.    
To test the hypothesized relationships on three-year strategic variation, the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step difference method was employed (Roodman, 2006).  
Unlike regressions in which models are tested in steps (e.g. control model, main effect 
model, moderation model, and full model), with GMM it is beneficial to start with what 
is considered the ‘full model’ by including all possible regressors (Roodman, 2006).   
Following this practice (e.g. David et al., 2006; Vaaler, 2008), only the ‘full models’ are 
presented.  GMM results in Table 14 display six models, one per combination of 
overconfidence and prior firm performance measures.   
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Table 5 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Variation Controlling for Industry Adjusted ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant -0.27 0.69 -0.27 0.69 -0.26 0.83 -0.18 0.69 -0.31 0.69 -0.25 0.69 -0.50 0.83 -0.44 0.83 
Diversification 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.07 
Prior One-Year Strategic Variation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Size -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Industry Adjusted ROA -0.82 0.30 -0.82 0.30 -0.82 0.30 -0.82 0.30 -0.81 0.30 -0.82 0.30 -0.80 0.30 -0.81 0.30 
BOD Composition 0.11 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.37 0.12 0.37 
BOD Independence 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.23 -0.01 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 
CEO Duality 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07 
Blockholder Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Ownership -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Annual Compensation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.03 0.09 -0.18 0.74 -0.12 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.75 0.05 0.74 
Tenure 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Age 
      
-0.01 0.01 
    
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-0.01 0.02 
  
-0.01 0.02 
LTCS x Age 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
0.02 0.01 
    
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 0.03 
F 3.33 3.20 2.97 3.01 3.00 2.92 2.64 2.58 
R2 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.02 0.02 
 All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 6 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Variation Controlling for ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant -0.27 0.69 -0.27 0.69 -0.25 0.83 -0.18 0.69 -0.31 0.70 -0.25 0.69 -0.49 0.83 -0.43 0.83 
Diversification 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.07 
Prior One-Year Strategic Variation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Size -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.17 0.09 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
ROA -1.08 0.33 -1.08 0.33 -1.08 0.33 -1.08 0.34 -1.07 0.34 -1.07 0.33 -1.07 0.33 -1.07 0.33 
BOD Composition 0.11 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.13 0.37 0.12 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.13 0.37 0.13 0.37 
BOD Independence 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.23 
CEO Duality 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.07 
Blockholder Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Ownership -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Annual Compensation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.03 0.09 -0.21 0.74 -0.12 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.75 0.03 0.74 
Tenure 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Age 
      
-0.01 0.01 
    
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-0.01 0.02 
  
-0.01 0.02 
LTCS x Age 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
0.02 0.01 
    
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 0.03 
F 3.40 3.27 3.05 3.08 3.07 2.98 2.71 2.64 
R2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 
 All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 7 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Variation Controlling for TSR 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 0.04 0.69 0.04 0.69 0.05 0.83 0.12 0.69 0.02 0.70 0.05 0.69 -0.19 0.83 -0.15 0.83 
Diversification 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 
Prior One-Year Strategic Variation 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Size -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.09 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
TSR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BOD Composition 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.37 
BOD Independence -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.23 
CEO Duality 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07 
Blockholder Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Ownership -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Annual Compensation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.02 0.09 -0.15 0.74 -0.12 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.75 0.10 0.75 
Tenure 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Age 
      
-0.01 0.01 
    
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-0.01 0.02 
  
-0.01 0.02 
LTCS x Age 
    
0.00 0.01 
      
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
0.02 0.01 
    
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 0.03 
F 3.54 3.40 3.15 3.24 3.14 3.11 2.79 2.77 
R2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.02 0.021 0.021 
All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 8 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for Industry Adjusted ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 140.49 94.41 140.59 94.30 -23.55 142.84 121.21 94.98 136.06 95.35 143.73 94.85 -14.11 140.94 -8.14 146.08 
Diversification -7.16 14.22 -6.85 14.25 -8.12 14.14 -7.26 14.23 -7.06 14.24 -6.41 14.26 -8.35 14.12 -7.82 14.14 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 
Size -13.65 12.45 -12.02 12.36 -10.19 12.40 -11.13 12.25 -11.49 12.40 -12.17 12.39 -10.11 12.32 -10.45 12.30 
Unabsorbed Slack -3.75 3.80 -3.62 3.79 -3.48 3.80 -3.69 3.84 -3.65 3.79 -3.57 3.79 -3.54 3.83 -3.48 3.83 
Industry Adjusted ROA 19.10 62.71 18.20 62.64 21.09 62.80 17.92 62.74 19.06 62.14 18.50 62.65 20.99 62.69 20.81 63.20 
BOD Composition -3.63 74.02 -4.84 73.98 -5.15 73.67 -4.36 74.46 -5.16 73.77 -5.59 74.13 -7.39 74.03 -7.49 74.28 
BOD Independence 21.85 58.24 23.12 58.45 26.18 57.83 23.59 58.31 22.38 58.70 22.91 58.52 25.51 58.19 26.12 57.94 
CEO Duality 17.44 14.68 16.69 14.56 21.50 14.97 17.32 14.93 16.83 14.56 16.71 14.57 20.34 15.10 20.41 15.11 
Blockholder Ownership 0.00 0.45 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.44 -0.01 0.44 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.43 
CEO Ownership -1.27 1.07 -1.33 1.09 -0.93 0.96 -1.42 1.06 -1.33 1.07 -1.32 1.09 -1.02 0.85 -1.01 0.88 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
-25.86 20.49 411.81 195.57 1.00 27.61 -22.40 18.23 -29.11 21.43 403.69 214.81 399.59 211.81 
Age 
    
2.62 1.98 
      
2.37 2.18 2.34 2.19 
Tenure 
      
1.63 1.70 
    
0.66 1.96 0.68 1.91 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-1.64 1.34 
  
-1.49 1.35 
LTCS x Age 
    
-7.99 3.77 
      
-7.72 4.27 -7.73 4.28 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-3.91 2.82 
    
-0.57 3.45 -0.64 3.38 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
2.41 2.36 
  
1.94 2.43 
F 3.76 3.584 3.236 3.364 3.325 3.495 2.873 3.011 
R2 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.024 
 All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 9 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 140.59 94.38 140.70 94.27 -24.09 142.99 121.21 94.97 136.01 95.37 143.86 94.80 -14.81 141.10 -8.63 146.18 
Diversification -7.24 14.18 -6.92 14.21 -8.20 14.10 -7.34 14.19 -7.14 14.20 -6.48 14.23 -8.44 14.08 -7.91 14.10 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 
Size -13.73 12.43 -12.10 12.34 -10.29 12.37 -11.21 12.23 -11.56 12.39 -12.26 12.37 -10.18 12.30 -10.55 12.27 
Unabsorbed Slack -3.88 3.80 -3.75 3.79 -3.64 3.80 -3.84 3.84 -3.78 3.78 -3.70 3.78 -3.70 3.83 -3.64 3.83 
ROA 32.46 76.07 31.38 75.99 36.69 76.27 32.90 75.83 32.32 75.40 31.93 76.01 36.88 75.77 36.88 76.38 
BOD Composition -4.09 73.87 -5.29 73.83 -5.71 73.51 -4.89 74.29 -5.58 73.63 -6.06 73.97 -7.91 73.86 -8.06 74.10 
BOD Independence 21.37 58.17 22.65 58.39 25.62 57.75 23.06 58.21 21.92 58.64 22.43 58.45 24.96 58.10 25.54 57.84 
CEO Duality 17.51 14.66 16.76 14.54 21.58 14.94 17.40 14.91 16.90 14.53 16.78 14.54 20.43 15.08 20.50 15.09 
Blockholder Ownership 0.00 0.45 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.44 -0.01 0.44 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.43 
CEO Ownership -1.28 1.07 -1.34 1.09 -0.94 0.96 -1.43 1.06 -1.34 1.07 -1.33 1.09 -1.03 0.85 -1.02 0.87 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
-25.81 20.48 413.20 195.93 1.25 27.52 -22.37 18.22 -29.10 21.43 404.76 215.09 400.68 212.08 
Age 
    
2.63 1.98 
      
2.38 2.18 2.35 2.19 
Tenure 
      
1.64 1.70 
    
0.67 1.95 0.69 1.90 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-1.66 1.34 
  
-1.51 1.35 
LTCS x Age 
    
-8.01 3.78 
      
-7.73 4.27 -7.74 4.28 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-3.94 2.81 
    
-0.59 3.44 -0.66 3.37 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
2.43 2.36 
  
1.97 2.43 
F 3.808 3.63 3.278 3.408 3.366 3.533 2.909 3.043 
R2 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.024 
 All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 10 
Fixed effects Regression on One-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for TSR 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 135.51 93.64 136.24 93.53 -26.92 142.71 117.12 93.40 130.47 93.67 139.15 94.15 -17.55 139.72 -11.01 146.22 
Diversification -7.17 14.23 -6.87 14.27 -8.16 14.15 -7.28 14.25 -7.07 14.25 -6.42 14.28 -8.40 14.13 -7.87 14.15 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 
Size -12.97 12.46 -11.39 12.39 -9.62 12.44 -10.53 12.24 -10.70 12.30 -11.51 12.42 -9.47 12.20 -9.89 12.30 
Unabsorbed Slack -3.63 4.09 -3.51 4.08 -3.34 4.08 -3.58 4.13 -3.52 4.07 -3.45 4.08 -3.40 4.11 -3.34 4.11 
TSR 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 
BOD Composition -1.67 75.45 -2.95 75.40 -3.11 75.14 -2.51 75.93 -3.17 75.09 -3.70 75.55 -5.50 75.43 -5.65 75.77 
BOD Independence 22.27 58.34 23.58 58.57 26.84 57.98 24.04 58.44 22.80 58.80 23.35 58.63 26.11 58.34 26.73 58.09 
CEO Duality 17.47 14.75 16.71 14.63 21.52 15.02 17.30 15.01 16.86 14.62 16.73 14.63 20.27 15.17 20.34 15.17 
Blockholder Ownership 0.01 0.43 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.43 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.42 
CEO Ownership -1.30 1.08 -1.37 1.10 -0.99 0.98 -1.46 1.08 -1.37 1.08 -1.37 1.11 -1.09 0.88 -1.08 0.90 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
-26.24 20.56 411.89 195.67 0.54 27.63 -22.74 18.36 -29.53 21.51 404.08 214.98 400.00 211.95 
Age 
    
2.61 1.98 
      
2.35 2.18 2.32 2.19 
Tenure 
      
1.63 1.70 
    
0.68 1.95 0.70 1.90 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
-1.66 1.32 
  
-1.50 1.33 
LTCS x Age 
    
-8.00 3.78 
      
-7.74 4.27 -7.75 4.28 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-3.90 2.83 
    
-0.53 3.47 -0.60 3.39 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
2.44 2.33 
  
1.97 2.40 
F 3.54 3.37 3.05 3.14 3.16 3.34 2.72 2.86 
R2 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.024 
 All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 11 
Fixed effects Regression on Three-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for Industry Adjusted ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 96.08 110.46 95.98 111.42 98.26 115.51 84.11 109.32 86.58 116.97 92.08 112.23 95.94 122.00 100.03 121.26 
Diversification -32.07 11.14 -32.07 11.15 -31.53 11.26 -32.45 11.30 -31.86 11.14 -32.53 11.08 -31.59 11.29 -32.29 11.26 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 
Size 5.31 13.78 5.28 13.50 4.74 13.35 5.53 13.46 6.68 14.30 5.27 13.49 6.74 14.14 5.36 13.40 
Unabsorbed Slack -6.78 5.31 -6.78 5.30 -6.96 5.28 -6.80 5.32 -6.65 5.31 -7.00 5.29 -6.89 5.31 -7.22 5.30 
Industry Adjusted ROA 28.10 36.56 28.15 36.48 28.20 36.54 27.98 36.48 31.11 36.81 27.02 36.70 30.99 36.73 26.93 36.66 
BOD Composition -115.18 88.14 -115.11 88.59 -117.27 88.95 -115.57 88.67 -112.41 88.77 -112.77 89.02 -112.89 88.98 -112.95 89.29 
BOD Independence -65.94 42.63 -65.96 42.56 -66.98 42.81 -65.77 42.45 -63.69 42.25 -64.81 42.60 -64.26 42.28 -65.54 42.68 
CEO Duality 3.67 18.80 3.68 18.71 0.74 19.48 2.25 20.28 4.37 18.74 3.55 18.67 0.92 20.40 0.45 20.38 
Blockholder Ownership 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.30 
CEO Ownership 1.17 1.15 1.17 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.13 1.16 1.15 0.90 1.00 0.94 1.02 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.69 14.76 -67.41 143.23 17.90 20.84 -5.03 15.69 6.73 16.45 -108.56 147.94 -94.12 152.16 
Age 
    
0.09 1.60 
      
-0.35 1.69 -0.32 1.72 
Tenure 
      
1.44 1.39 
    
1.65 1.55 1.55 1.54 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
2.77 3.68 
  
2.78 3.66 
LTCS x Age 
    
1.26 2.71 
      
2.34 2.92 2.29 3.03 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-2.41 1.96 
    
-3.47 2.34 -3.43 2.35 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
-4.74 4.88 
  
-4.65 4.87 
F 3.96 3.84 3.55 3.46 3.59 3.69 3.07 3.11 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 
  All models include 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 12 
Fixed effects Regression on Three-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for ROA 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 95.53 110.29 95.44 111.27 97.73 115.43 83.51 109.18 86.09 116.88 91.55 112.07 95.54 121.96 99.62 121.18 
Diversification -32.11 11.12 -32.11 11.14 -31.57 11.24 -32.49 11.28 -31.90 11.13 -32.56 11.07 -31.64 11.28 -32.32 11.24 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 
Size 5.33 13.78 5.30 13.50 4.77 13.35 5.55 13.46 6.69 14.30 5.29 13.49 6.76 14.14 5.39 13.40 
Unabsorbed Slack -6.74 5.27 -6.74 5.26 -6.91 5.24 -6.77 5.29 -6.61 5.27 -6.96 5.25 -6.85 5.27 -7.18 5.27 
ROA 22.80 39.72 22.83 39.73 22.29 39.64 23.47 39.97 26.50 40.29 21.49 40.01 26.65 40.22 21.64 40.01 
BOD Composition -115.00 88.01 -114.94 88.46 -117.06 88.84 -115.44 88.55 -112.30 88.65 -112.58 88.89 -112.78 88.88 -112.77 89.18 
BOD Independence -65.63 42.41 -65.64 42.33 -66.63 42.60 -65.48 42.24 -63.39 42.03 -64.48 42.37 -63.96 42.07 -65.21 42.46 
CEO Duality 3.71 18.81 3.72 18.73 0.79 19.50 2.29 20.29 4.42 18.75 3.59 18.68 0.98 20.42 0.50 20.40 
Blockholder Ownership 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.30 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.30 
CEO Ownership 1.18 1.15 1.18 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.06 1.11 1.15 1.13 1.17 1.15 0.91 1.00 0.94 1.02 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.59 14.78 -67.15 143.16 17.92 20.87 -5.15 15.72 6.65 16.47 -108.32 147.80 -93.96 152.04 
Age 
    
0.09 1.60 
      
-0.35 1.69 -0.32 1.72 
Tenure 
      
1.45 1.39 
    
1.66 1.55 1.56 1.54 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
2.77 3.68 
  
2.79 3.66 
LTCS x Age 
    
1.25 2.71 
      
2.34 2.92 2.28 3.03 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-2.42 1.97 
    
-3.48 2.35 -3.44 2.35 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
-4.75 4.89 
  
-4.66 4.87 
F 3.96 3.83 3.55 3.46 3.59 3.69 3.07 3.11 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 
  All models include 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 13 
Fixed effects Regression on Three-Year Strategic Deviation Controlling for TSR 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Constant 86.90 110.04 86.74 111.20 89.71 115.43 74.81 109.39 74.68 117.83 83.26 111.87 83.71 122.37 90.77 120.88 
Diversification -31.81 11.12 -31.82 11.13 -31.24 11.24 -32.19 11.27 -31.61 11.12 -32.28 11.07 -31.29 11.27 -31.99 11.24 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 
Size 6.40 13.76 6.36 13.49 5.86 13.36 6.62 13.47 8.12 14.45 6.28 13.47 8.26 14.32 6.46 13.41 
Unabsorbed Slack -6.58 5.19 -6.58 5.19 -6.77 5.16 -6.60 5.22 -6.43 5.20 -6.82 5.18 -6.67 5.20 -7.03 5.19 
TSR 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 
BOD Composition -111.40 87.62 -111.30 88.10 -113.45 88.47 -111.57 88.22 -108.33 88.37 -108.96 88.49 -108.48 88.64 -108.76 88.84 
BOD Independence -64.80 42.20 -64.83 42.13 -65.90 42.36 -64.62 42.01 -62.65 41.82 -63.66 42.16 -63.30 41.82 -64.44 42.21 
CEO Duality 3.85 18.78 3.88 18.69 0.88 19.48 2.60 20.25 4.61 18.70 3.74 18.65 1.23 20.38 0.75 20.37 
Blockholder Ownership 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.30 
CEO Ownership 1.30 1.19 1.30 1.19 1.23 1.14 1.19 1.14 1.26 1.16 1.30 1.19 1.05 1.04 1.09 1.06 
Annual Compensation -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 
  
0.94 14.81 -71.02 143.30 18.27 20.88 -4.66 15.73 7.07 16.49 -113.14 148.21 -98.36 152.45 
Age 
    
0.07 1.60 
      
-0.35 1.69 -0.32 1.72 
Tenure 
      
1.41 1.39 
    
1.62 1.55 1.52 1.54 
Option-based Overconfidence 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
Stock-based Overconfidence 
          
2.80 3.67 
  
2.82 3.66 
LTCS x Age 
    
1.33 2.72 
      
2.44 2.93 2.38 3.04 
LTCS x Tenure 
      
-2.43 1.96 
    
-3.52 2.35 -3.49 2.36 
LTCS x Options 
        
0.00 0.00 
  
0.00 0.00 
  
LTCS x Stocks 
          
-4.81 4.88 
  
-4.71 4.87 
F 3.98 3.85 3.55 3.48 3.70 3.73 3.14 3.13 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 
 All models include 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 14 
GMM on Three-Year Strategic Variation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE Coef. RSE 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Variation 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.05 
Size 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
ROA 
  
-1.23 0.34 
    
-1.25 0.34 
  Industry Adjusted ROA -1.27 0.33 
    
-1.28 0.33 
    TSR 
    
0.00 0.00 
    
0.00 0.00 
BOD Composition 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.13 0.55 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.24 0.53 
BOD Independence -0.58 0.45 -0.57 0.45 -0.57 0.46 -0.61 0.43 -0.60 0.43 -0.59 0.44 
CEO Duality 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Blockholder Ownership 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CEO Ownership -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Annual Compensation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 0.63 0.79 0.57 0.79 0.61 0.79 0.61 0.84 0.56 0.84 0.66 0.85 
Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Option-based Overconfidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      Stock-based Overconfidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LTCS x Tenure 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
LTCS x Age -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
LTCS x Options 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      LTCS x Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chi2 62.83 62.75 47.55 120.27 116.28 93.58 
AR(1) -8.04 -8.04 -7.89 -8.03 -8.02 -7.94 
AR(2) -1.17 -1.16 -0.96 -1.24 -1.25 -1.14 
Hansen’s J 514.49 512.38 556.15 510.67 497.92 540.60 
 All models include 3,866 firm-year observations across 714 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level.  
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Results 
One-Year Strategic Variation 
Results of the fixed effects regression with robust standard errors on one-year 
strategic variation are presented in Tables 5 through 7.  These tests included 4,807 firm-
year observations across 772 firms.  Each of the models had appropriate fit, as indicated 
by a significant F statistic.  A significant F statistic indicates that the models can be 
utilized to test whether the variables in the model are significantly related to the 
dependent variable (Hair et al., 2006).   
The hypothesized variables were not significantly related to the dependent 
variable of one-year strategic variation on any of the models in Tables 5 through 7.  This 
is indicated by non-significant coefficients on any of the hypothesized variables (i.e. 
Long-term Compensation Structure, LTCS x Age, LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x Options, and 
LTCS x Stocks).  This finding suggests that none of the four hypotheses were supported 
on one-year strategic variation.   Further, this relationship was found to be consistent 
across three measures of firm performance and two measures of overconfidence.  That is, 
long-term compensation structure was not found to significantly relate to a one-year 
strategic variation regardless of the measure of firm performance utilized.  Further, 
hypothesized moderators (executive age, tenure and both option- and stock-based 
overconfidence) did not significantly affect this relationship as hypothesized.  
One-Year Strategic Deviation 
Analyses that tested the hypothesized relationships with one-year strategic 
deviation as the dependent variable are presented in Tables 8 through 10.  These tests 
were conducted on a sample of 4,807 firms across 772 firms.  All models exhibited 
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appropriate fit, as indicated by a significant F statistic.  This suggests that the models can 
be utilized to test whether the predictor variables are significantly related to the 
dependent variable (Hair et al., 2006).   
The results of these tests do not support the hypothesized relationships.   Although 
a significant and positive coefficient on long-term compensation (Hypothesis 1) and a 
significant and negative interaction with executive age (Hypothesis 2) were found in 
some tests (i.e. Model 3 in Tables 8, 9 and 10 only; significant change in F at p < .05), 
the fact that these findings were not robust to the addition of executive tenure and/or 
overconfidence indicates that Hypotheses 1 and 2 did not receive support.  This is 
because these relationships were not significantly related when alternative explanatory 
variables were included (Hair et al., 2006).  If a significant relationship becomes non-
significant when an alternative predictor variable is added to a model, the first 
relationship cannot be supported as significant (Hair et al., 2006).  So while the 
hypothesized relationships were found in Model 3 of Tables 8, 9, and 10, the fact that 
these relationships were not significant when adding executive tenure and overconfidence 
to the models indicates that Hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot be supported on one-year strategic 
deviation.  Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported in any of the tests, as is indicated by 
non-significant coefficients on the hypothesized interaction terms (i.e. LTCS x Tenure, 
LTCS x Options, and LTCS x Stocks).    
Three-Year Strategic Deviation 
Tests of the hypothesized relationships with three-year strategic deviation as the 
dependent variable are presented in Tables 11 through 13.  Analyses were conducted on a 
sample of 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Significant F statistics were 
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found for all models, indicating appropriate fit.  This finding suggests that that the models 
can be utilized to test hypotheses (Hair et al., 2006).   
Non-significant coefficients were found on all of the hypothesized variables (i.e. 
Long-term Compensation Structure, LTCS x Age, LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x Options, and 
LTCS x Stocks).  These findings do not support any of the four hypotheses, regardless of 
measures utilized.  Long-term compensation structure was not found to significantly 
relate to three-year strategic deviation.  This is indicated by the non-significant 
coefficients on Long-term Compensation Structure on all tests in which three-year 
strategic deviation is the dependent variable.  Further, this relationship was not found to 
be significantly moderated by executive age, tenure or overconfidence.  This is evidenced 
by non-significant interaction terms (i.e. LTCS x Age, LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x Options, 
and LTCS x Stocks) in these tests.  Cumulatively, these findings indicate that none of the 
four hypotheses are supported since none of the posited relationships were found to be 
significantly related to three-year strategic deviation.   
Three-Year Strategic Variation 
To test the hypothesized relationships on three-year strategic variation, a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) employing the Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step 
difference method with robust standard errors was performed.  The results for these tests 
appear in Table 14.  Because GMM uses a system of equations to create instrumental 
variables, the sample size was reduced in tests utilizing GMM in two ways.  First, GMM 
requires data from a prior time period (i.e. t - 1) to estimate instruments for current time 
periods (i.e. t).  Because GMM requires an additional observation for use as an 
instrument (i.e. t – 1), any firms that had only four years of data had to be removed from 
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analysis since a minimum of five years of data is necessary (i.e. from t – 1 to t + 3).  This 
occurs because it is not possible to utilize the first time period (i.e. t – 1) to create 
instruments for the current time period (t) and still have three years of time elapse to 
calculate the dependent variable over three years (i.e. in time t + 3) if only four years of 
data are present.  Second, because GMM uses the first observation for each firm to 
calculate instruments for subsequent observations, the sample size is reduced by one 
observation per firm.  As such, the final sample size for GMM models was reduced to 
3,866 firm-year observations across 714 firms. 
All GMM specifications were met for each of the six models, suggesting the 
GMM models are valid for use in hypotheses testing (Roodman, 2006).  Each models 
exhibited appropriate fit (Chi2 < .05), which suggests that the models can be utilized to 
test whether significant relationships exist (Hair et al., 2006).  The Arellano-Bond test 
was utilized to establish instrumental validity, which is indicated by a significant AR(1) 
and a non-significant AR(2).  Instrumental validity suggests that the instrumental 
variables calculated are valid for use in estimating the GMM as they do not exhibit 
autocorrelation.  The overidentification restriction was assessed using Hansen’s J.  The 
Hansen’s J is used because the Sargan test is inconsistent with robust standard errors 
(Roodman, 2006).  A non-significant Hansen’s J indicates that that the instruments are 
independent of the residuals and are valid for use.    
Results of the GMM do not support any of the four hypothesized relationships.  
This is indicated by non-significant coefficients on the hypothesized variables (Long-term 
Compensation Structure, LTCS x Age, LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x Options, and LTCS x 
Stocks).  Long-term compensation was not found to significantly relate to three-year 
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strategic variation across any of the six models.  Similarly, none of the moderators 
significantly affected the strength of this relationship.  In light of these findings, the 
hypothesized relationships are not supported when three-year strategic variation is the 
dependent variable.   
Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 It was contended in Chapter II that long-term compensation structure would 
positively relate to strategic change and that executive age, tenure and overconfidence 
would moderate this relationship.  These hypotheses were tested on four different 
measures of strategic change (i.e. two conceptualizations of change assessed at two time 
intervals).  The results of those tests do not provide support for any of the hypothesized 
relationships.   
When one-year strategic deviation was used as the dependent variable, long-term 
compensation structure was found to be significantly related to strategic change 
(Hypothesis 1) and age was found to significantly weaken this relationship (Hypothesis 
2).  However, because this relationship was not robust to the addition of alternative 
explanatory variables, these hypotheses are not supported (Hair et al., 2006).  This is 
because significant relationships that become non-significant with the inclusion of 
additional predictor variables are not robust to alternative explanations.  As such, these 
relationships are not supported (Hair et al., 2006).   Because Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not 
robust to the addition of tenure and/or overconfidence as alternative explanatory 
variables, these hypotheses do not receive support.   
Further, these two relationships (i.e. Hypotheses 1 and 2) were found only when 
one-year strategic deviation was used as the dependent variable.  These hypotheses did 
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not receive support with any other dependent variable.  Because the relationship occurs 
only when a specific measure is utilized (i.e. one-year strategic deviation), we cannot 
contend that the relationship exists (Hair et al., 2006).  That is, since a relationship only 
exists in the context of a specific measure of a strategic change but not with other 
measures of strategic change, we cannot contend that the relationship exists since it is not 
robust to various measures (Hair et al., 2006).  In summation, because Hypotheses 1 and 
2 are not robust to the addition of alternative explanatory variables or alternative 
measures of strategic change, they are not supported.   
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported in any of the tests.  This is indicated by 
the fact that none of the coefficients were significant for the hypothesized variables (i.e. 
LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x Options, and LTCS x Stocks) in any of the tests that were run.  As 
such, Hypothesis 3, which posited a weakening effect of tenure on the relationship 
between long-term compensation structure and strategic change, was not supported.  
Similarly, support for Hypothesis 4, which contended that overconfidence would 
significantly strengthen the relationship between long-term compensation and strategic 
change, was not found in any of the tests.  This finding was consistent whether an option-
based or a stock-based measure of overconfidence was utilized.  
 In summation, none of the four hypotheses were supported.  The positive 
relationship between long-term compensation structure and strategic change that was 
contended in Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  Further, this relationship was not 
weakened by executive age (Hypothesis 2) or tenure (Hypothesis 3) nor was it 
strengthened by executive overconfidence (Hypothesis 4).  Since none of the four 
hypotheses were supported, Hair and colleagues (2006) suggest conducting post-hoc 
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analysis to investigate the possibility that decisions made by the researcher may 
contribute to the unsupported hypotheses.  Following this recommendation, post-hoc 
analysis was conducted.  Additional information regarding post-hoc analysis is provided 
in the next section.   
Post-hoc Analysis 
As Hair and colleagues (2006) note, it is possible that choices made by 
researchers can contribute to unsupported hypotheses.  This can occur in two ways: 
inclusion of control variables and measurement of variables.  Both of these possibilities 
were explored in post-hoc analysis.   
Variable Inclusion Decisions 
Including control variables may bias estimates and thus contribute to unsupported 
hypotheses (Hair et al., 2006).  This is because control variables are often identified from 
extant research even though it may not be possible to account for contextual effects from 
that research that are either unreported (e.g. alterations to model specification; details of 
sample data) or unrecognized (e.g. presence of unspecified additive or moderating 
effects; failure to alter models appropriately; failure to identify contextual effects of a 
sample).  As a case in point, once a variable X is found to affect an outcome of interest Y, 
subsequent research often includes X as a control whenever assessing alternative 
relationships with Y (e.g. Z on Y; W on Y).  However, if X is dependent on some 
contextual factor that was unreported or unrecognized in the original test, controlling for 
X in tests of other variables (e.g. Z, W) on Y may actually bias estimates (Hair et al., 
2006).   Including control variables, then, may bias estimates and contribute to 
unsupported hypotheses and it is important that researchers investigate this possibility.     
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A technique that is recommended when theoretically justified relationships are 
unsupported is backward elimination (Hair et al., 2006).  Backward elimination starts 
with a ‘full’ regression model (i.e. a regression with all identified independent and 
control variables) and removes predictors that the researcher believes may be biasing 
estimates.  This method is valuable in the context of unsupported hypotheses since it 
allows researchers to identify if estimates are sensitive to the removal of variables or if 
the theoretical arguments are unsupported even after accounting for this possibility.  As 
such, backward elimination was conducted on each of the four dependent variables.   
Backward Elimination 
Backward elimination is a tool that can be utilized to identify if the inclusion of 
variables may be biasing estimates.  Although this methodology can help researchers 
determine if estimates are sensitive to variable inclusion, it should be noted that backward 
elimination is a subjective technique.  The subjective nature of backward elimination is 
worth noting for two reasons.  First, there is not a statistical test that scholars can employ 
to identify which variables should be eliminated.  Although there are rules of thumb (e.g. 
low correlation, insignificant estimates) that can be utilized to identify such variables, it 
is up to the researcher to provide rationale for their removal.  Second, since it may not be 
possible to determine if prior research properly accounted for contextual effects of a 
variable, extant research may not be informative with respect to which variables to 
include or exclude from a model.   Because of these limitations, scholars must exercise 
caution in using this technique to avoid ‘data mining’ or ‘data fishing.’  That is, while 
backward elimination may be of value, it should not be utilized to justify variable 
removal aimed at generating significant results only.  Rather, rationale should be 
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provided for the removal of each variable and results should be interpreted accordingly.  
Following this recommendation, rationale is provided whenever a variable is removed 
from analysis.   
Variable Removal 
Because variable removal decisions are subjective (Hair et al., 2006), it is 
important that researchers provide rationale regarding why a variable was removed.  This 
helps guard against the potential that variables are removed solely to generate significant 
results.  As such, rationale is provided for the removal of each variable and results 
reported as variables are removed.   
To facilitate the presentation of post-hoc results, three changes were made to post-
hoc tests from hypotheses tests.  First, because estimates were consistent across each of 
the three measures of firm performance (i.e. ROA, Industry Adjusted ROA, and TSR) 
and both measures of overconfidence (i.e. option- and stock-based), for parsimony, post-
hoc analyses was estimated with ROA and option-based overconfidence only.  If 
warranted by significant findings, subsequent analysis was conducted to determine if 
those findings are robust to different measures of firm performance and overconfidence, 
respectively.  Second, because it is possible that moderating variables may be candidates 
for removal, this possibility was also investigated.  To determine if findings are sensitive 
to the inclusion of moderating variables, twelve models were run for each dependent 
variable.  This includes one model for each possible combination of the three moderators.  
Third, to aid in the presentation of results, only the coefficients are reported; standard 
errors are omitted from the results unless additional analysis is warranted.   
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Removing Diversification 
The first variable that was identified for removal is diversification.  
Diversification was removed for three reasons.  First, the measure of diversification that 
is utilized (entropy) has been employed as a measure of strategic change (e.g. Westphal 
& Bednar, 2005; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  As such, utilizing entropy to control 
for diversification may confound the actual relationship with the dependent variables 
utilized (e.g. Robins & Wiersema, 2003).  Removing entropy from the model will 
eliminate this concern.  Second, Hair and colleagues (2006) recommend removing 
variables that do not strongly relate to the variable of interest.  Entropy is not highly 
correlated with any of the dependent variables (r < .06), and as a result is a candidate for 
removal.  Third, diversification was already removed from analyses in which the three-
year value of strategic variation was assessed and removing the variable from all models 
facilitates the comparison of results.   
Post-hoc results after the removal of diversification are presented in Tables 15 
through 18.  Results are presented in the same order as hypotheses testing: one-year 
strategic variation (Table 15) followed by one-year strategic deviation (Table 16), three-
year strategic deviation (Table 17) and three-year strategic variation (Table 18).  Further, 
tests utilize the same analytic techniques that were used in hypothesis testing.  Although 
diversification was previously omitted from tests on three-year strategic variation, 
possible combinations of the moderators were not tested since GMM typically includes 
all possible variables (Roodman, 2006).  However, in post-hoc analysis, only one 
moderator is being tested per model.  If a significant relationship is found, further testing 
was conducted to identify if the variable is robust to the inclusion of other moderators.   
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Table 15 
Post-Hoc Analysis on One-Year Strategic Variation after Removing Diversification 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant -0.217 -0.184 -0.107 -0.064 -0.200 -0.159 -0.045 -0.008 -0.299 -0.130 -0.198 -0.121 
Prior One-Year Strategic 
Variation 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 
Size -0.176 -0.181 -0.179 -0.184 -0.179 -0.184 -0.179 -0.184 -0.176 -0.176 -0.179 -0.178 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029 
ROA -0.951 -0.959 -0.953 -0.962 -0.952 -0.961 -0.955 -0.964 -0.949 -0.952 -0.951 -0.952 
BOD Composition 0.138 0.137 0.117 0.114 0.136 0.134 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.138 0.115 0.121 
BOD Independence -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 -0.010 -0.006 
CEO Duality 0.154 0.155 0.142 0.141 0.155 0.155 0.161 0.161 0.155 0.162 0.141 0.149 
Blockholder Ownership 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CEO Ownership 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Long-Term Compensation 
Structure -0.155 -0.143 -0.172 -0.161 -0.107 -0.106 -0.111 -0.110 0.014 0.012 0.019 0.016 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 
  
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
Tenure -0.005 -0.005 
  
-0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.003 
  
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
        
LTCS x Tenure 
    
0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 
    
LTCS x Options 
        
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 2.386 2.421 2.485 2.527 2.403 2.428 2.504 2.534 2.368 2.467 2.468 2.578 
R2 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 
All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level.   
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Table 16 
Post-Hoc Analysis on One-Year Strategic Deviation after Removing Diversification 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant -2.820 -1.415 -9.996 -8.559 187.739 189.931 132.495 134.742 208.480 151.114 197.406 151.415 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 
Size -11.307 -11.515 -11.122 -11.308 -11.334 -11.622 -11.336 -11.651 -12.110 -12.134 -11.798 -12.206 
Unabsorbed Slack -3.769 -3.770 -3.750 -3.751 -3.899 -3.900 -3.960 -3.962 -3.815 -3.878 -3.782 -3.888 
ROA 38.450 38.093 38.668 38.353 33.557 33.058 34.555 34.011 32.031 33.035 32.371 32.997 
BOD Composition -10.384 -10.469 -9.029 -9.144 -6.083 -6.194 -6.680 -6.803 -7.038 -7.697 -4.693 -8.256 
BOD Independence 1.549 1.552 1.585 1.587 2.450 2.459 0.383 0.388 1.039 -1.171 1.103 -1.271 
CEO Duality 17.851 17.854 18.720 18.696 17.508 17.511 15.195 15.192 17.357 14.926 18.842 14.495 
Blockholder Ownership 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.030 0.026 0.028 0.027 
CEO Ownership -0.636 -0.635 -0.589 -0.589 -1.002 -1.001 -0.889 -0.887 -0.923 -0.803 -0.845 -0.816 
Annual Compensation -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 400.805 401.252 401.939 402.290 -0.916 -0.865 0.520 0.580 -23.810 -22.905 -24.319 -22.754 
Age 2.582 2.584 2.711 2.709 -1.123 -1.126     -1.176   -0.977   
Tenure 0.306 0.295     2.170 2.165 1.624 1.616 0.523 -0.095     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age -7.809 -7.818 -7.835 -7.842                 
LTCS x Tenure         -3.781 -3.801 -3.879 -3.901         
LTCS x Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 2.976 3.070 3.056 3.152 2.981 3.081 3.116 3.227 2.933 3.065 3.012 3.149 
R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level.   
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Table 17 
Post-Hoc Analysis on Three-Year Strategic Deviation after Removing Diversification 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 92.155 100.572 89.868 99.480 61.749 69.794 91.733 98.822 74.238 101.970 72.381 100.918 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 
Size 1.428 0.383 1.482 0.412 1.689 0.729 1.833 0.890 1.496 1.637 1.543 1.919 
Unabsorbed Slack -5.710 -5.780 -5.700 -5.775 -5.664 -5.731 -5.637 -5.703 -5.622 -5.596 -5.613 -5.545 
ROA 16.809 15.265 16.931 15.327 17.844 16.411 17.264 15.878 18.763 18.244 18.865 18.612 
BOD Composition -97.587 -98.557 -97.082 -98.319 -96.404 -97.234 -96.022 -96.844 -96.612 -96.212 -96.169 -93.823 
BOD Independence -64.829 -64.859 -64.844 -64.867 -64.338 -64.341 -63.457 -63.483 -63.102 -62.254 -63.115 -62.062 
CEO Duality 0.988 0.974 1.296 1.117 1.098 1.086 2.411 2.365 1.250 2.478 1.517 4.220 
Blockholder Ownership 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
CEO Ownership 0.901 0.912 0.913 0.918 0.886 0.894 0.841 0.850 0.920 0.878 0.931 0.920 
Annual Compensation -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
Long-Term Compensation Structure -37.931 -36.887 -37.693 -36.781 16.099 16.200 15.163 15.286 -3.284 -3.898 -3.356 -4.453 
Age 0.251 0.244 0.294 0.264 0.627 0.610     0.584   0.619   
Tenure 0.109 0.050     0.990 0.968 1.290 1.260 0.095 0.394     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
LTCS x Age 0.733 0.706 0.727 0.703                 
LTCS x Tenure         -2.025 -2.097 -1.979 -2.050         
LTCS x Options                 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
F 3.483 3.399 3.640 3.565 3.460 3.416 3.594 3.584 3.455 3.608 3.617 3.796 
R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
All models include 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level.   
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Table 18 
Post-Hoc Analysis on Three-Year Strategic Variation after Removing Diversification 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Variation -0.102 -0.102 -0.101 -0.101 -0.105 -0.105 -0.102 -0.101 -0.103 -0.100 -0.102 -0.100 
Size -0.028 -0.021 -0.038 -0.031 -0.016 -0.010 -0.030 -0.023 -0.024 -0.038 -0.033 -0.038 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
ROA -1.025 -1.025 -1.033 -1.034 -1.016 -1.017 -1.022 -1.023 -1.027 -1.034 -1.036 -1.037 
BOD Composition 0.938 0.947 0.951 0.961 0.996 1.004 0.991 0.999 0.967 0.961 0.980 0.971 
BOD Independence -0.279 -0.277 -0.267 -0.266 -0.249 -0.249 -0.240 -0.239 -0.260 -0.250 -0.249 -0.247 
CEO Duality 0.108 0.106 0.115 0.113 0.111 0.109 0.100 0.098 0.104 0.092 0.111 0.101 
Blockholder Ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
CEO Ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 0.631 0.617 0.623 0.609 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.025 -0.074 -0.071 -0.076 -0.074 
Age -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006     -0.006   -0.002   
Tenure 0.006 0.006     0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.002     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012                 
LTCS x Tenure         -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013         
LTCS x Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2  33.47  31.82 33.29 31.66  34.22  32.68 33.95 32.43  33.00  32.73  32.83  32.61  
AR(1) -8.818 -8.822 -8.800 -8.803 -8.788 -8.792 -8.780 -8.784 -8.790 -8.781 -8.772 -8.772 
AR(2) -3.891 -3.894 -3.858 -3.861 -3.886 -3.889 -3.848 -3.850 -3.860 -3.818 -3.827 -3.824 
Hansen's J  388.02 398.86  398.91  398.34  402.16  401.97  402.57  402.30  398.91  399.66  398.95  399.49  
  All models include 3,866 firm-year observations across 714 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level.   
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Results after Removing Diversification 
 Results from post-hoc analysis after removing diversification were consistent with 
the results found from hypotheses testing.  First, all tests exhibited appropriate fit (F < 
.05 value in Tables 15, 16 and 17; Chi 2 < .05 in Table 18), which indicates that they can 
be used to assess the hypothesized relationships (Hair et al., 2006).  Second, the only 
relationships that were found to be supported were Hypotheses 1 and 2.  However, these 
relationships were significant when one-year strategic deviation was utilized as the 
dependent variable only.  This finding is indicated by the significant coefficients on the 
variables Long-term Compensation Structure and LTCS x Age when one-year strategic 
deviation is the dependent variable (i.e. Table 16, Models 1 through 4) and non-
significant coefficients on all other hypothesized variables  (i.e. LTCS x Tenure, LTCS x 
Options, and LTCS x Stocks) across all dependent variables. 
Since Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported only when one-year strategic deviation 
was used as the dependent variable but not when other measures of strategic change were 
used as the dependent variable, these hypotheses cannot be supported.  This is because 
when a relationship exists in the context of a specific measure of a construct only but not 
with other measures of the construct (here, strategic change), we cannot contend that the 
relationship exists since it is not robust to various measures (Hair et al., 2006).  Because 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are significant only when one-year strategic deviation is the 
dependent variable, they cannot be supported since they are not robust to other measures 
of strategic change.  Further, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are not significantly related to strategic 
change in any of the analyses.  This finding suggests that these two hypotheses are not 
supported.       
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Adjusting the Sampling Time-Frame 
A second post-hoc adjustment was assessed to identify whether the inclusion of 
time-periods may have contributed to unsupported hypotheses.  This can occur if ‘events’ 
within the sampling timeframe (1996 through 2006) affect the occurrence of strategic 
change.  Including sampling frames in which the occurrence of the dependent variable is 
either abnormally limited or expanded may lead to biased estimates (Hair et al., 2006; 
Whitley, 2001).  This is because the relationships will be artificially weakened or 
strengthened, respectively, in correspondence with the abnormal occurrence of the 
dependent variable.  This is similar to contemporaneous correlation, which exists when 
error terms are correlated within a time period due to a unique event within a time period 
(Beck & Katz, 1995).  However, contemporaneous correlation does not account for 
unique events that may exist across time periods.  So while the addition of time dummies 
may account for contemporaneous correlation due to events in specific time periods that 
affected strategic change (e.g. economic conditions, governmental regulation; Porter, 
1980), time dummies will not account for effects of events that are sustained across time 
periods.  If an event occurred that was sustained over more than one time period (i.e. 
years, in this study) and that event affected the occurrence of the dependent variable, this 
has the potential to bias estimates since this effect is not being factored into calculations 
of those estimates.   
One event that may have affected the occurrence of the dependent variable was 
the tragedies of September 11, 2001.  Economic and political uncertainty (including 
engaging in subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) that followed this event may have 
impacted the willingness of firms to change strategies over a sustained period of time.  To 
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account for this possibility, analysis was re-run on the years 1996 through 2000 only.  
The earlier years were chosen because research has yet to determine the extent to which 
the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent economic and political uncertainty 
affected firms.  To avoid the potential that economic and political uncertainty in the years 
immediately following September 11, 2001 confounds estimation of relationships during 
this time-frame, the earlier time frame (i.e. 1996 to 2000) was utilized.  Further, because 
similar time-frames have been used by other scholars to investigate strategic change (e.g. 
Carpenter, 2000; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan; 2003; 2009) these 
results may be more comparable to the extant literature.  
For consistency and parsimony, the same post-hoc analytic procedures were 
employed as were used with models in which diversification was removed: models are 
estimated with ROA and option-based overconfidence only and subsequent analysis was 
conducted if significant relationships are found to determine if the relationships are 
robust to alternative measures.  Further, to identify if the relationships are sensitive to the 
inclusion of the moderating variables, one model was run for each possible combination 
of these variables.  Only the coefficients are reported from this analysis unless additional 
tests are warranted.   
Presentations of these results follow the same methodology as the previous post-
hoc analysis, as do the analytic techniques employed.  Tests on one-year strategic 
variation are displayed in Table 19 followed by one-year strategic deviation (Table 20), 
three-year strategic deviation (Table 21), and three-year strategic variation (Table 22).  
The results of these analyses are presented next.   
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Table 19 
Post-Hoc Analysis on One-Year Strategic Variation from 1996 to 2000.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 0.086 0.036 0.430 0.392 0.641 0.601 1.177 1.138 0.403 0.963 0.745 0.990 
Prior One-Year Strategic Variation -0.109 -0.110 -0.109 -0.109 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.108 
Size -0.341 -0.333 -0.347 -0.342 -0.345 -0.338 -0.336 -0.330 -0.340 -0.331 -0.346 -0.340 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
ROA -0.243 -0.234 -0.241 -0.235 -0.227 -0.219 -0.250 -0.242 -0.240 -0.263 -0.238 -0.252 
BOD Composition 0.750 0.754 0.684 0.687 0.683 0.687 0.676 0.679 0.757 0.751 0.691 0.701 
BOD Independence -0.362 -0.365 -0.355 -0.357 -0.369 -0.371 -0.335 -0.337 -0.357 -0.320 -0.349 -0.330 
CEO Duality 0.289 0.290 0.243 0.244 0.291 0.292 0.323 0.323 0.287 0.320 0.241 0.269 
Blockholder Ownership 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
CEO Ownership -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 0.619 0.631 0.625 0.634 -0.396 -0.394 -0.412 -0.411 -0.126 -0.141 -0.113 -0.124 
Age 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012     0.013   0.006   
Tenure -0.020 -0.020 
    -0.038 -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 -0.020 -0.013     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013                 
LTCS x Tenure         0.040 0.040 0.041 0.041         
LTCS x Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 3.145 3.313 3.214 3.397 3.216 3.387 3.281 3.471 3.012 3.047 3.063 3.200 
R2 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 
 All models include 2,218 firm-year observations across 604 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 20 
Post-Hoc Analysis on One-Year Strategic Deviation from 1996 to 2000.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 267.681 247.375 261.927 239.112 647.925 626.859 583.883 559.175 627.086 570.941 623.312 571.867 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.264 -0.263 -0.264 -0.263 -0.263 -0.263 -0.263 -0.262 -0.264 -0.263 -0.264 -0.263 
Size -64.924 -62.015 -64.836 -61.843 -64.075 -60.716 -65.279 -61.859 -62.875 -63.913 -62.815 -64.253 
Unabsorbed Slack 18.116 18.010 18.164 18.074 18.547 18.419 18.839 18.719 18.453 18.701 18.484 18.658 
ROA 40.492 44.668 40.481 44.727 41.066 45.906 43.960 49.100 39.406 41.917 39.395 42.367 
BOD Composition -132.04 -130.08 -130.93 -128.52 -123.09 -120.95 -122.50 -120.26 -126.72 -126.40 -126.002 -128.32 
BOD Independence -98.687 -99.901 -98.833 -100.122 -92.188 -93.576 -96.330 -97.954 -98.258 -102.021 -98.366 -102.355 
CEO Duality 26.862 27.276 27.671 28.396 24.791 25.266 21.016 21.336 23.738 20.414 24.266 18.409 
Blockholder Ownership -0.166 -0.162 -0.165 -0.160 -0.231 -0.226 -0.225 -0.220 -0.218 -0.212 -0.217 -0.213 
CEO Ownership -3.271 -3.297 -3.238 -3.251 -3.234 -3.260 -3.207 -3.233 -3.189 -3.162 -3.167 -3.218 
Annual Compensation -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 853.930 858.922 853.825 858.865 -45.910 -45.226 -43.929 -43.132 -27.446 -25.835 -27.585 -25.186 
Age 5.568 5.542 5.691 5.711 -1.492 -1.558     -1.310   -1.230   
Tenure 0.344 0.471     0.446 0.548 -0.339 -0.268 0.226 -0.498     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
LTCS x Age -16.361 -16.431 -16.364 -16.436                 
LTCS x Tenure         -0.071 0.027 -0.155 -0.057         
LTCS x Options                 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
F 15.027 13.859 15.798 14.677 17.375 16.094 18.343 17.014 16.917 17.963 17.810 18.960 
R2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
 All models include 2,218 firm-year observations across 604 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 21 
Post-Hoc Analysis on Three-Year Strategic Deviation from 1996 to 2000.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 55.680 36.389 79.688 59.574 -88.548 -105.03 -27.150 -45.021 -76.093 -17.886 -52.553 -16.688 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.135 -0.134 -0.135 -0.134 -0.135 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.136 
Size 10.837 13.575 10.470 13.097 10.351 12.948 11.453 13.911 9.881 10.905 9.501 10.460 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.978 -1.065 -1.176 -1.244 -1.059 -1.146 -1.346 -1.420 -1.125 -1.389 -1.319 -1.446 
ROA -7.890 -4.106 -7.765 -4.180 -6.905 -3.322 -8.842 -5.335 -6.205 -8.000 -6.049 -7.519 
BOD Composition -53.380 -51.407 -57.870 -55.661 -54.158 -52.391 -54.805 -53.086 -54.940 -55.318 -59.305 -57.802 
BOD Independence 9.355 8.347 9.811 8.820 7.727 6.769 11.359 10.318 9.064 12.652 9.582 12.178 
CEO Duality -21.100 -20.684 -24.509 -23.860 -20.417 -20.027 -16.908 -16.649 -20.027 -16.679 -23.356 -19.363 
Blockholder Ownership -0.311 -0.307 -0.316 -0.312 -0.289 -0.286 -0.295 -0.291 -0.292 -0.297 -0.297 -0.299 
CEO Ownership 1.462 1.440 1.325 1.314 1.410 1.391 1.385 1.368 1.433 1.405 1.297 1.332 
Annual Compensation -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Long-Term Compensation Structure -310.82 -306.16 -310.47 -306.07 26.574 27.138 24.486 25.098 14.007 12.236 14.886 13.137 
Age -1.190 -1.213 -1.700 -1.684 1.416 1.367     1.345   0.848   
Tenure -1.408 -1.297     -0.976 -0.903 -0.253 -0.208 -1.384 -0.655     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age 6.001 5.937 6.016 5.954                 
LTCS x Tenure         -1.024 -0.951 -0.931 -0.863         
LTCS x Options                 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
F 2.920 3.019 2.910 3.023 2.849 2.941 2.994 3.097 2.920 3.075 2.921 3.099 
R2 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
All models include 2,205 firm-year observations across 599 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 22 
Post-Hoc Analysis on Three-Year Strategic Variation from 1996 to 2000.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Variation -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 -0.106 -0.106 -0.108 -0.108 -0.104 -0.106 -0.105 -0.107 
Size 0.009 0.012 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.026 0.055 0.057 0.009 0.039 0.020 0.038 
Unabsorbed Slack -0.072 -0.074 -0.071 -0.073 -0.066 -0.068 -0.067 -0.069 -0.080 -0.082 -0.079 -0.083 
ROA -2.220 -2.222 -2.218 -2.220 -2.173 -2.176 -2.156 -2.159 -2.222 -2.205 -2.220 -2.202 
BOD Composition 0.593 0.580 0.591 0.577 0.681 0.663 0.682 0.664 0.641 0.643 0.639 0.645 
BOD Independence -0.877 -0.875 -0.877 -0.875 -0.863 -0.860 -0.853 -0.850 -0.871 -0.861 -0.871 -0.859 
CEO Duality 0.018 0.022 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.028 0.032 0.015 0.027 0.014 0.031 
Blockholder Ownership 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CEO Ownership -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Long-Term Compensation Structure 0.713 0.731 0.722 0.739 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.009 -0.088 -0.092 -0.087 -0.094 
Age 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007     0.007   0.004   
Tenure -0.003 -0.002     0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.001     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTCS x Age -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
        
LTCS x Tenure         -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 
      
LTCS x Options                 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2 22.95 22.89 22.67 22.59 24.48 24.39 23.37 23.27 23.20 22.34 22.91 22.32 
AR(1) -6.147 -6.156 -6.138 -6.147 -6.111 -6.119 -6.108 -6.116 -6.110 -6.108 -6.104 -6.101 
AR(2) -2.283 -2.284 -2.293 -2.294 -2.287 -2.289 -2.306 -2.307 -2.277 -2.295 -2.289 -2.286 
Hansen's J 136.81 136.73 136.66 136.59 137.35 137.32 138.64 138.62 136.91 137.86 136.78 138.24 
 All models include 1,542 firm-year observations across 528 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.  
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Results after Adjusting the Sampling Time-Frame 
Post-hoc tests after removing data from the time-frame later than 2000 exhibited 
appropriate fit on tests using fixed effects regression (F < .05 value in Tables 19, 20 and 
22).  However, tests using GMM did not exhibit appropriate fit (Chi 2 > .05 in Table 22).  
These findings indicate that the tests using fixed effects regression can be used to assess 
the hypothesized relationships but that the GMM tests should not be analyzed since the 
models do not exhibit appropriate fit (Hair et al., 2006).  This is because the variables 
included do not significantly affect the dependent variable of three-year strategic 
variation when considered jointly.  As such, the model is not valid for determining if 
individual variables affect the dependent variable (Hair et al., 2006).   
Results suggest that none of the four hypothesized relationships are supported.  
As with previous analyses, two hypothesized relationships were significantly related to 
one of the four dependent variables only while the other two hypotheses were not 
supported in any of the tests.  As opposed to previous tests in which Hypotheses 1 and 2 
were significant on one of the dependent variables, after removing data from the years 
2001 through 2006, coefficients on the variables corresponding to Hypothesis 1 (i.e. 
Long-term Compensation Structure) and Hypothesis 3 (i.e. LTCS x Tenure) were found to 
significantly relate to one of the dependent variables only.  In this case, long-term 
compensation structure was found to significantly affect one-year strategic variation and 
this relationship was significantly moderated by executive tenure (Table 19, Models 5 
through 8).  The direction of the relationships were opposite of what was contended, 
however.  As such, the hypothesized relationships cannot be supported since they were 
not in the direction that was contended.  Rather than positively affecting this relationship, 
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it was found that long-term compensation structure was negatively related to one-year 
strategic variation.  Similarly, Hypotheses 3 argued that executive tenure would weaken 
the relationship between long-term compensation structure and strategic change.  
However, the results of post-hoc analysis suggest that tenure significantly strengthens this 
relationship, as is indicated by the positive coefficient on the interaction term of LTCS x 
Tenure.  Because these relationships were opposite of what was contended, the 
hypotheses are not supported.   Additionally, since this relationship was not robust to 
other conceptualizations of strategic change (i.e. one- and three-year strategic deviation, 
three-year strategic variation) this finding should be viewed with caution.  Neither 
Hypotheses 2 nor 4 were supported in any of the post-hoc analyses that utilized the 1996 
through 2000 time-frame.  This is indicated by the lack of significant coefficients for 
LTCS x Age (i.e. Hypothesis 2) and LTCS x Options (i.e. Hypothesis 4).  Cumulatively, 
these findings suggest that the hypothesized relationships are not affected by including 
the post-September 11, 2001 time-frame in the analysis.   
Conclusion of Backward Elimination 
Backward elimination was conducted to account for the possibility that the 
inclusion of variables may bias estimates and contribute to unsupported hypotheses (Hair 
et al., 2006).  While backward elimination can help researchers identify if estimates are 
sensitive to variable selection, caution must be exercised to avoid removing variables in 
perpetuity until significant results are generated.  Rather, scholars should provide 
rationale for the elimination of each variable.  Of the variables remaining, none were 
deemed as having sufficient rationale for removal.  This is because each variable has 
received support across multiple investigations of strategic change, a fact which reduces 
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the concern that scholars did not account for contextual specific effects of these variables.  
That is, because each of the remaining variables have demonstrated consistent 
relationships with strategic change across a number of diverse samples, there is less 
concern that sample-specific characteristics may have biased estimates (Hair et al., 2006).  
As such, backward elimination was concluded after removing diversification and altering 
the sampling time-frame, respectively.   
Measurement of Variables 
Hair and colleagues (2006) identified two categories of choices made by 
researchers that can contribute to unsupported hypotheses: inclusion of control variables 
and measurement of variables.  The inclusion of control variables was addressed in the 
previous section.  In this section, measurement decisions made in this study are analyzed 
to determine if these choices may have contributed to unsupported hypotheses.   
Measurement decisions made by researchers may contribute to unsupported 
hypotheses because the use of a particular measure can bias estimates (Hair et al., 2006).  
This can occur if measures either lack validity (e.g. Boyd, Gove & Hitt, 2005; 
Venkatraman & Grant, 1986) or are not comparable across groups in a sample (Hair et 
al., 2006; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  Five concerns with respect to the validity of 
measures have been previous addressed in this chapter.  These included: 
1. Capturing strategic change relative to different referents (i.e. strategic 
variation and strategic deviation; Carpenter, 2000).  
2. Assessing strategic change over two time intervals (i.e. one-year and 
three-years) to account for the fact that there is not an agreed upon time 
interval during which strategic change can or should occur (Westphal et 
al., 2001).   
3. Employing two measures of executive overconfidence (i.e. option-based 
and stock-based) to address concerns with respect to the validity of extant 
measures (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). 
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4. Testing whether relationships are robust to three different measures of 
firm performance (i.e. ROA, Industry Adjusted ROA, and TSR) since 
single measures of performance may lack validity (e.g. Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986). 
5. Removing diversification because no extant measure is without limitations 
(e.g. Robins & Wiersema, 2003).     
 
Although concerns with respect to the validity of measures have been addressed 
previously in this chapter, the possibility that measures are not comparable across 
groups within the sample has not been addressed.  If measures are not comparable 
across groups, estimates of any relationships can be biased (Hair et al., 2006; 
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  For instance, if a researcher was interested in 
assessing the impact of workers’ life satisfaction (Diener, 1984) on various work 
outcomes (e.g. job performance, job satisfaction, absenteeism, turnover 
intentions) but the measure of life satisfaction was not invariant across different 
groups within the sample (e.g. gender, cultures,  religions), then it is possible that 
group affiliation is biasing the estimates (e.g. gender, Shevlin, Brunsden, & Miles, 
1998; cultures, Dorahy, Schumaker, Simpson, & Deshpande, 1996; religions, 
Dorahy, Lewis, Schumaker, Akuamoah-Boateng, Duze, & Sibiya, 1998).  
 A group membership that is present in this study is the industry in which 
each firm operates.  Because different practices can exist across industries 
(Hrebiniak & Snow, 1980; Porter, 1980), it is possible that different practices with 
respect to the payment of executives exist across industries as well.  One way to 
account for differences that exist across industries is to standardize affected 
measures to industry membership (e.g. Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 2006).  This helps account for differences that exist 
across industries and makes the measures more comparable across them.  As such, 
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to determine if differences exist across industry with respect to the long-term 
compensation structure of executives, this variable was adjusted to each firm’s 
primary industry (as determine by 4-digit SIC code).   
Following this adjustment, additional post-hoc analyses were conducted using 
Industry Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure (LTCS) in lieu of Long-term 
Compensation Structure.  Similarly, this adjustment was also made to all interaction 
variables created with long-term compensation structure, resulting in the following 
variables: Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age, Industry Adjusted LTCS x Tenure, Industry 
Adjusted LTCS x Options and Industry Adjusted LTCS x Stocks.  To remain consistent 
with prior analysis, analytic procedures followed those used with previous post-hoc 
analysis.  All models were tested with ROA and option-based overconfidence only.  To 
identify if relationships are robust to the inclusion of moderating variables, one model 
was run for each possible combination of moderators.  Because diversification may be 
confounded with the measures of strategic change, diversification was dropped from all 
tests.  Since removing the time frame after 2000 did not impact results, tests were 
conducted using all years of data (i.e. 1996 to 2006).  For parsimony, only the 
coefficients are reported from this analysis unless additional tests are warranted.   
Post-hoc analysis adjusting long-term compensation for industry follows the same 
procedures as previous post-hoc analysis and utilizes the same analytic techniques as 
well.  Tests on one-year strategic variation are displayed first (Table 23) followed by one-
year strategic deviation (Table 24), three-year strategic deviation (Table 25) and three-
year strategic variation (Table 26).  The results of all tests are discussed after the 
presentation of the tables.  
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Table 23 
Post Hoc Analysis with Industry Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure on One-Year Strategic Variation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant -0.303 -0.265 -0.199 -0.151 -0.301 -0.263 -0.141 -0.106 -0.303 -0.139 -0.199 -0.128 
Prior One-Year Strategic 
Variation 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 
Size -0.174 -0.179 -0.177 -0.182 -0.173 -0.178 -0.173 -0.178 -0.174 -0.174 -0.176 -0.176 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
ROA -0.947 -0.955 -0.950 -0.959 -0.949 -0.957 -0.952 -0.960 -0.949 -0.952 -0.951 -0.952 
BOD Composition 0.136 0.135 0.114 0.111 0.136 0.135 0.138 0.137 0.135 0.136 0.112 0.118 
BOD Independence -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 
CEO Duality 0.155 0.155 0.141 0.141 0.155 0.155 0.162 0.161 0.155 0.162 0.141 0.148 
Blockholder Ownership 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CEO Ownership 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted Long-Term 
Compensation Structure 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.025 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003     0.003   0.001   
Tenure -0.005 -0.005     -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001                 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x 
Tenure         0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001         
Industry Adjusted LTCS x 
Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 2.454 2.462 2.559 2.573 2.467 2.486 2.568 2.592 2.437 2.539 2.539 2.653 
R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 24 
Post Hoc Analysis with Industry Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure on One-Year Strategic Deviation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 203.461 206.839 189.807 193.137 202.824 206.557 147.564 151.276 203.293 147.96 189.849 147.875 
Prior One-Year Strategic Deviation -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.091 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 
Size -13.541 -13.978 -13.196 -13.586 -13.335 -13.818 -13.319 -13.832 -13.335 -13.310 -12.995 -13.292 
Unabsorbed Slack -3.936 -3.938 -3.898 -3.901 -3.882 -3.884 -3.944 -3.946 -3.878 -3.935 -3.841 -3.932 
ROA 34.173 33.436 34.602 33.949 33.061 32.241 34.048 33.182 32.910 33.870 33.333 33.882 
BOD Composition -6.327 -6.491 -3.435 -3.661 -4.938 -5.113 -5.559 -5.748 -5.663 -6.313 -2.826 -6.154 
BOD Independence 1.640 1.644 1.696 1.698 1.465 1.468 -0.628 -0.633 1.374 -0.722 1.429 -0.696 
CEO Duality 17.339 17.343 19.154 19.105 17.325 17.329 14.987 14.981 17.275 14.930 19.062 15.052 
Blockholder Ownership 0.047 0.047 0.044 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.039 0.035 0.036 0.035 
CEO Ownership -0.849 -0.847 -0.752 -0.753 -0.920 -0.917 -0.803 -0.800 -0.920 -0.804 -0.824 -0.800 
Annual Compensation -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
Industry Adjusted Long-Term 
Compensation Structure 34.931 35.087 34.867 35.005 -1.614 -1.610 -1.332 -1.326 -2.139 -2.100 -2.149 -2.101 
Age -1.125 -1.129 -0.879 -0.890 -1.135 -1.140     -1.136   -0.893   
Tenure 0.637 0.616     0.633 0.609 0.034 0.006 0.627 0.027     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age -0.636 -0.638 -0.635 -0.637                 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Tenure         -0.040 -0.041 -0.054 -0.055         
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 2.992 3.090 3.073 3.175 3.140 3.248 3.271 3.392 3.110 3.246 3.207 3.349 
R2 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
All models include 4,807 firm-year observations across 772 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 25 
Post Hoc Analysis with Industry Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure on Three-Year Strategic Deviation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Constant 73.779 82.555 72.198 82.064 73.301 82.079 101.70 109.50 73.23 100.95 71.455 99.793 
Prior Three-Year Strategic 
Deviation -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 
Size 1.607 0.565 1.643 0.578 1.449 0.407 1.577 0.552 1.496 1.611 1.537 1.871 
Unabsorbed Slack -5.653 -5.724 -5.646 -5.722 -5.668 -5.739 -5.641 -5.712 -5.628 -5.604 -5.620 -5.554 
ROA 17.042 15.521 17.129 15.550 17.399 15.878 16.847 15.372 18.340 17.816 18.438 18.189 
BOD Composition -97.974 -98.880 -97.598 -98.766 -97.362 -98.268 -96.973 -97.873 -96.813 -96.385 -96.391 -93.957 
BOD Independence -64.675 -64.706 -64.687 -64.709 -64.909 -64.940 -64.040 -64.094 -63.893 -63.063 -63.907 -62.884 
CEO Duality 1.074 1.054 1.297 1.121 1.064 1.043 2.319 2.264 1.177 2.404 1.428 4.152 
Blockholder Ownership 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.051 
CEO Ownership 0.914 0.924 0.923 0.927 0.922 0.933 0.879 0.890 0.918 0.876 0.928 0.919 
Annual Compensation -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
Industry Adjusted Long-Term 
Compensation Structure -3.793 -3.803 -3.817 -3.810 1.890 1.872 1.675 1.663 -0.817 -0.836 -0.818 -0.850 
Age 0.580 0.563 0.610 0.572 0.601 0.584 
  
0.586 
 
0.619 
 
Tenure 0.079 0.024 
  
0.081 0.026 0.391 0.328 0.089 0.392 
  
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.056 
        
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Tenure 
    
-0.143 -0.143 -0.131 -0.131 
    
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Options 
        
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F 3.425 3.390 3.584 3.557 3.408 3.379 3.549 3.549 3.385 3.530 3.548 3.718 
R2 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 
All models include 4,715 firm-year observations across 731 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
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Table 26 
Post Hoc Analysis with Industry Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure on Three-Year Strategic Variation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Prior Three-Year Strategic Deviation -0.066 -0.066 -0.065 -0.065 -0.066 -0.065 -0.062 -0.062 -0.066 -0.063 -0.065 -0.064 
Size 0.051 0.057 0.035 0.041 0.055 0.061 0.039 0.045 0.052 0.035 0.035 0.033 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
ROA -1.024 -1.026 -1.037 -1.039 -1.017 -1.019 -1.025 -1.027 -1.022 -1.031 -1.035 -1.036 
BOD Composition 1.023 1.030 1.043 1.051 1.029 1.035 1.024 1.031 1.027 1.020 1.045 1.042 
BOD Independence -0.234 -0.234 -0.217 -0.217 -0.236 -0.236 -0.227 -0.226 -0.234 -0.224 -0.218 -0.217 
CEO Duality 0.054 0.053 0.066 0.064 0.055 0.053 0.043 0.041 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.063 
Blockholder Ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
CEO Ownership -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Annual Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted Long-Term 
Compensation Structure -0.032 -0.032 -0.044 -0.045 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 
Age -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007     -0.006   -0.001   
Tenure 0.008 0.009     0.008 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005     
Option-based Overconfidence 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000                 
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Tenure         -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001         
Industry Adjusted LTCS x Options                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2 97.630 95.050 97.510 94.920 206.230 203.630 201.610 198.670 97.940 96.130 97.930 96.690 
AR(1) -8.653 -8.655 -8.628 -8.630 -8.668 -8.670 -8.658 -8.660 -8.656 -8.646 -8.632 -8.631 
AR(2) -3.437 -3.439 -3.401 -3.403 -3.441 -3.444 -3.399 -3.400 -3.439 -3.396 -3.403 -3.408 
Hansen's J 391.170 390.320 394.360 393.470 391.760 390.910 391.760 390.790 390.370 390.250 393.230 393.260 
All models include 3,866 firm-year observations across 714 firms.  Bold coefficients are significant at the p < .05 level.   
 
 107  
Results after Adjusting Long-term Compensation Structure by Industry 
After adjusting long-term compensation by industry, each of the tests exhibited 
appropriate fit (F < .05 value in Tables 23, 24 and 25; Chi 2 < .05 in Table 26).  This 
finding suggests that the tests can be used to assess the hypothesized relationships (Hair 
et al., 2006).  The results of post-hoc analysis using Industry Adjusted Long-term 
Compensation Structure confirm prior findings; none of the four hypothesized 
relationships were supported.  This is indicated by coefficients that are not significant and 
in the hypothesized direction on the four variables of interest (i.e. Industry Adjusted 
Long-term Compensation Structure, Industry Adjusted LTCS x Age, Industry Adjusted 
LTCS x Tenure, Industry Adjusted LTCS x Options).   The coefficient on Industry 
Adjusted Long-term Compensation Structure was significant when: 1. three-year strategic 
deviation or three-year strategic variation were used as the dependent variable; and 2. 
option-based overconfidence was included in the model (Tables 24 and 26, Models 9 
through 12).   The direction of the relationships were opposite of what was hypothesized, 
however.  As a result, Hypothesis 1 is not supported in these contexts because the 
relationship was not in the specified direction.  Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 were unsupported 
across all tests, as is indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the three moderating 
variables.   In summation, none of the four hypotheses were supported after adjusting 
long-term compensation structure for industry.  Although Hypotheses 1 was significant in 
a limited number of contexts (i.e. in Models 9 through 12 in Tables 24 and 26 only), 
because the relationships were not in the direction that was contended, this relationship is 
not be supported.  Similarly, Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are not supported since they did not 
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significantly affect the relationships between long-term compensation structure and 
strategic change. 
Summary of Post-hoc Analysis 
 None of the four hypothesized relationships received support in post-hoc analysis.    
While some significant relationships were found in the post-hoc analysis (e.g. Tables 16, 
19, 24, and 26), these relationships were either not robust to various measures of strategic 
change or were not in the hypothesized direction.  These findings suggest that none of the 
four hypotheses can be supported in post-hoc analysis.  The findings of post-hoc analysis 
confirm the findings from hypotheses testing that none of the contended relationships are 
supported.  Further, the findings from post-hoc testing help demonstrate that these 
relationships are consistent across the removal of potential confounds (i.e. diversification, 
time-period effects) and the adjustments of measures to facilitate comparison across 
groups (i.e. long-term compensation structure).  The positive relationship between long-
term compensation structure and strategic change that was contended in Hypothesis 1 
was not supported.  This relationship was not weakened by executive age or tenure 
(Hypotheses 2 and 3) and was not strengthened by executive overconfidence (Hypotheses 
4).   
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results of hypotheses testing were discussed.  These results 
were presented in five parts.  First, the data collection process was explained.  Second, 
descriptive statistics and correlations were discussed.  Third, the underlying properties of 
the data were tested so that the appropriate analytical technique could be determined.  
Fourth, hypothesis testing was conducted.  Fifth, post-hoc analysis was conducted to 
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investigate whether the findings from hypotheses testing were sensitive to the inclusion 
of certain variables or the measurement of variables that may not be comparable across 
groups within the sample (Hair et al., 2006).  Results of hypotheses testing and post-hoc 
analysis were in agreement that the hypothesized relationships were not supported.  
These findings were consistent across four measures of strategic change as well as the 
removal of potential confounds and the adjustment of measures to facilitate group 
comparison. These findings are discussed in Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how the individual characteristics 
of executives and the compensation structures under which they operate mutually affect 
organizational outcomes.  Specifically, the role that executive age, tenure and 
overconfidence play in moderating the relationship between long-term compensation and 
strategic change was analyzed.  In this chapter, the findings of this analysis are discussed.  
This discussion includes four parts.  First, empirical results are reviewed.  Second, 
implications of these results to both research and practice are provided.  Third, limitations 
of the research are highlighted along with avenues for future research.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the research.     
Review of Empirical Results 
 The results of this dissertation fall in line with prior research that has 
demonstrated an inconsistent relationship between long-term compensation structure and 
organizational outcomes (Denis, 2001; Devers et al., 2007).  While scholars have offered 
theoretical explanations for these equivocal findings (e.g. Hanlon et al., 2003; Jensen et 
al., 2004), little research has empirically assessed these rationales (Hambrick, 2007).  
One potential explanation for the inconsistent results, that executive characteristics
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moderate the relationship between long-term compensation and organizational outcomes 
(Wowak & Hambrick, 2010), was investigated in this dissertation.  The results of this 
dissertation did not support this argument on the organizational outcome of strategic 
change: analysis indicated a non-significant relationship between long-term 
compensation structure and strategic change and further, that this relationship was not 
significantly moderated by executive age, tenure or overconfidence as was posited.   
Although various explanations have been offered as to why long-term 
compensation has not demonstrated consistent relationships with organizational outcomes 
(cf. Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), two reasons appear to be most 
central to this dissertation.  First, that the theoretical relationships are more complex than 
current theory contends (Denis, 2001; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).  Second, that 
measurement difficulties obscure the actual relationships (e.g. Jensen & Zajac, 2004; 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  Both of these possibilites are discussed in the next 
section.   
Theoretical Complexity 
 One reason that has been suggested regarding why compensation research has 
failed to produce consistent findings is that these relationships are intricate (Devers et al., 
2007; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).  As Denis (2001) notes, compensation relationships 
“interact in complicated ways with” other aspects of the firm such that a mechanism that 
affects behavior in one context “may have no impact in another, making it difficult to 
pick up a relation by examining a broad cross-section of firms” (p. 208).  That is, because 
compensation is only one mechanism that affects executive decision-making, isolating 
this relationship is no easy task because various contextual factors could affect executive 
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actions (Sanders, 2001; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).  So while existing theory may 
support the contention that executive characteristics moderate the relationship between 
compensation and organizational outcomes (e.g. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 
2007), failure to account for additional interactions may contribute to inconsistent 
findings (Denis, 2001).  One reason for the non-significant findings, then, is that 
additional moderators interact with long-term compensation and executive characteristcs.   
Measurement Difficulty 
 A second explanation offered for the unsupported hypotheses is that measurement 
difficulty inherent to the study of executives (e.g. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004; Webb & Weick, 1979) hindered the ability to assess the hypothesized 
relationships.  These measurement difficulties were compounded with each of the three  
areas utilized in this dissertation (i.e. executive compensation, executive characteristics 
and strategic change).  In the following section, measurement concerns with each of the 
three areas are addressed.   
Measurement Difficultly with Executive Compensation  
 The lack of available information on executive compensation hinders the ability 
of researchers to assess relationships accurately (Denis, 2001).  Because executives are 
not required to report all of their personal finances (e.g. the composition of their personal 
investment portfolio; alternative sources of income; spousal income, etc.), the ability to 
isolate the effects of compensation is difficult.  That is, because how individuals respond 
to financial incentives may be different according to the composition of their investment 
portfolios (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it may not be possible to isolate the effect of one 
type of compensation without accounting for the entirety of their personal holdings.  
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While it may be possible to utilize alternative methods to gain access to this data (e.g. 
interviews, surveys), scholars have illustrated that executives are particularly prone to 
respond inaccuratly to sensitive questions (Day, Schleicher, Unckless & Hiller, 2002).  
This occurs for a variety of reasons, including that executives want to manage 
impressions and because someone else (e.g. an administrative assistant) may actually fill 
out the material for them.  As such, confidence in direct measures of executive 
compensation may be compromised because responses lack accuracy.  Because of these 
limitations, scholars are stuck between the proverbial ‘rock and a hard place’ with respect 
to compensation research; while archival databases include limited information, direct 
assessments may have limited validity.  Another reason for unsupported hypotheses, then, 
may be that difficultly in gathering executive compensation data limits the ability of 
researchers to isolate the effects of compensation.   
Measurement Difficultly with Executive Psychological Characteristics.   
Like compensation information, obtaining accurate data on the psychological 
characteristics of executives is difficult (Hambirck & Mason, 1984; Webb & Weick, 
1979).  The fact that both direct (e.g. Day et al., 2002) and indirect measures (e.g. Hiller 
& Hambrick, 2005) have limitations in assessing executive psychology may have 
impacted the accuracy of tests with respect to the moderating effects of overconfidence.  
For instance, while responses generated from direct assessment of executives often suffer 
from low validity, the same problem has plagued indirect measures.  As a result of 
measures lacking validity, the ability to assess whether executive psychology is affecting 
how these individuals respond to compensation is compromised (Hair et al., 2006; 
Whitley, 2001).   This limitation may have obscured the actual relationship posited in this 
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dissertation, contributing to the unsupported hypotheses with respect to the moderating 
role of executive overconfidence.   
Measurement Difficultly with Strategic Change.   
Limitations in the measurement of strategic change (e.g. different 
conceptualizations, time periods, measures) may be another factor that contributed to the 
equivocal results.   Although steps were taken to overcome these limitations (e.g. using 
both strategic variation and strategic deviation, testing the relationships across two time 
periods), it is possible that none of these steps improved the validity of the measures.  If 
measures are not valid, the ability the detect relationships consistently will be 
compromised (Hair et al., 2006; Whitley 2001).  As such, difficulty measuring strategic 
change accurately may have contributed to the failure to support the hypothesized 
relationships.   
Implications of Results 
Although the hypotheses outlined in Chapter II were not supported, this 
dissertation still has implications for both research and practice.  These implications are 
outlined in this section. 
Implications for Research 
 Though management scholars have long dealt with questions regarding how 
executives affect their organizations (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932; Schumpeter, 1942; 
Smith, 1776), this literature stream continues to generate research (e.g. Ballinger & 
Marcel, 2010; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010).  The findings of this dissertation contribute 
to that literature stream in two ways.  First, scholars (e.g. Hambrick, 2007; Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004; Sanders, 2001) have noted that in order to advance our understanding of 
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executives’ impact on organizational outcomes, it is necessary to combine insights gained 
from both upper echelons and agency theories.  This dissertation answers that call by 
developing arguments regarding the moderating effects of executive characteristics (a 
tenet of upper echelons theory) on the relationship between long-term compensation (a 
tenet of agency theory) and organizational outcomes.  Although the arguments provided 
were unsupported, they may serve as a starting point for future research.  Scholars can 
enhance the arguments provided herein and address additional moderators that may have 
contributed to the unsupported hypotheses.  As such, although the hypothesized 
relationships were unsupported in this dissertation, scholars can utilize this information to 
improve the development of their arguments in future investigations.   
 A second implication of this dissertation for researchers is that it has highlighed 
measurement difficulties associated with both executives and strategic change.  The 
measurement concerns outlined in this research may provide insight to scholars in 
devising ways to overcome these concerns in future research.  In particular, scholars may 
need to address 1. limitations in obtaining information regarding the personal financial 
portfolio of executives 2. problems associated with measureing executive psychological 
characteristics and 3. the lack of a consistent operalization of strategic change.  As this 
research has illustrated, measurement difficulties in these areas may affect scholars 
ability to adequately assess hypothesized relationships.   These findings may provide the 
impetus for scholars to improve measurement and echo the sentiments of scholars who 
have called for research on measurement of executive psychology (e.g. Hiller & 
Hambrick, 2005) and strategic change (e.g. Westphal et al., 2001).  By overcoming these 
areas of concern, research can be improved and the robustness of analysis can be 
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enhanced.  As such, highlighting measurement concerns with respect to assessing 
executive compensation, executive psychology and strategic change contributes to these 
respecitve literature streams. 
Implications for Practice 
An intended contribution of this dissertation was to add to our understanding of 
how executive characteristics interact with compensation structures.  This information 
may be beneficial to the design of more effective executive compensation plans since 
Boards of Directors could utilize this knowledge to design payment schemes that illicit 
the desired actions from their executives.  Although the results of this dissertation do not 
provide normative recommendations with respect to the interaction between executive 
characteristics and long-term compensation structure, this research may be of interest to 
practice nonetheless.   
Perhaps the primary benefit of this dissertation was that it highlighted the 
difficulties facing scholars when measuring executives.  This discussion may serve a as a 
call for organizations to be more active in providing information to researchers.  Since 
the Board of Directors and shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of this knowledge, 
this research is particularly salient to these individuals.  For the Board of Directors, 
developing a better understanding of what drives their executives to act in certain ways 
can help improve the design of compensation plans.  That is, by accounting for additional 
factors that affect how executives respond to compensation, Boards can devise more 
effective incentive schemes.  The Board of Directors can facilitate this line of inquiry by 
partnering with researchers and providing access to information on their executives.   
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For shareholders, knowledge of how executives may act given their personal 
characteristics and compensation structure may help identify which firms to invest in.  
One way for shareholders to help in this process is by taking a more active role in the 
corporate governance process.  By informing Board members of their desires for 
increased access to executive characteristics and subsequently reinforcing these desires 
by voting for Board members who facilitate such information disclosures, shareholders 
can improve their ability to forecast organizational actions and make their investment 
decisions accordingly.  Although the empirical findings did not support the hypothesized 
interactions, this dissertation may be informative to practice in calling for organizations 
to participate in this line of research by providing scholars with access to information on 
their executives.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The conclusions drawn from this dissertation should be considered in the context 
of limitations to this research.  These limitations are highlighted in this section, as are 
avenues for future research that can help scholars address these concerns.  
 The data collection method employed constitutes the first limitation of this 
dissertation.  As previously mentioned, both direct and indirect assessments have their 
strengths and weaknesses with respect to studying executive compensation and 
psychology.  In this dissertation, indirect assessment was utilized.  Although indirect 
approaches allow researchers to assess phenomena longitudinally through the use of 
archival data, the methodology limits what can be utilized as measures.  In particular, 
scholars can only assess those variables for which they can develop measures from 
existing sources.   
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The use of archival data creates two unique problems with respect to 
compensation data: 1. only publicly held firms are required to disclose compensation; and 
2. the information that they are required to disclose is limited to firm-specific 
information, which hinders the ability to accurately assess the effects of compensation.  
These problems cannot be rectified unless scholars utilize alternative methodologies or 
influence corporations and their executives to disclose additional information in the 
future.  As such, compensation scholars may want to consider the trade-offs of alternative 
methodologies to augment archival databases while also working with corporations to 
increase the accessibility of additional information.  In particular, the interactive effects 
of compensation with individual characteristics may need to be isolated in qualitative 
research or through the use of laboratory studies and simulations (cf. Hambrick, 2007).   
  Similarly, because archival information is only amenable to the study of 
phenomena in which scholars can develop measures of the construct of interest, this 
method has limitations when assessing psychology (Whitley, 2001).  Although indirect 
measures of executive psychology based upon archival data have added to our 
understanding of executive characteristics (e.g. narcissism, Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; 
hubris, Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), the validity of this method in assessing 
overconfidence has been questioned (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005).   As a result, the 
accuracy in the measurement of the moderating role of overconfidence must be 
considered a limitation.  Future research should endeavor to overcome this limitation.  
Some manners in which scholars may improve the assessment of executive 
overconfidence are: 1. pursuing the development of a valid proxy for use with archival 
data or 2. utilizing alternative methodologies (e.g. direct measurement, qualitative 
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approaches) to gain additional insights in this area.  Both avenues may be valuable for 
future research. 
 Although the use of archival data may limit the information that researchers have 
access to, what researchers do with that data is individually controlled.  As such, choices 
that researchers make can create limitations to their research.  A limitation of this 
research that was individually controlled was that only a narrow subset of constructs was 
considered.  For example, while compensation research has analyzed several facets of 
executive pay (Denis, 2001; Devers et al., 2007), this dissertation focused on only one 
aspect (long-term compensation).   Similarly, although several executive characteristics 
have been related to various organizational outcomes (cf. Finkelstein et al., 2009), only 
three constructs were analyzed in this dissertation.  Future research may want to expand 
this line of inquiry to other relevant constructs.   
Along the same lines, while executive characteristics and compensation have both 
been related to strategic change, several other dependent variables have been similarly 
related.  As a case in point, researchers have found that mergers and acquisitions are 
affected by both executive characteristics and compensation structures (Haleblian, 
Devers, Mcnamara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009).  Scholars investigating the interaction 
of executive characteristics and compensation structures may want to consider a broader 
spectrum of dependent variables in future research.  While prior outcomes that have been 
related to both compensation and executive characteristics (e.g. strategic change, 
mergers, acquisistions) may serve as a good starting point, extending this line of inquiry 
to other areas is recommended as well.   
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Lastly, the theoretical relationships around executive compensation may be more 
complex than was hypothesized in this dissertation (e.g. Denis, 2001).  To uncover these 
relationships, scholars may need to turn to more complex theoretical arguments 
incorporating multiple contextual considerations.  For instance, while theory may posit 
that executive characteristics moderate the relationship between long-term compensation 
and organizational outcomes (e.g. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 2007; Wowak & 
Hambrick, 2010), a third contextual variable could further obscure this relationship.  
Examples of potential moderators include conditions in the external environment 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1995) and performance aspiration levels (Sanders, 2001).  Future 
research aimed at uncovering such three-way interactions and other more complex 
relationships may advance this literature.   
SUMMARY 
Management scholars have long been interested in how executives affect the 
behavior of their organizations.  Much of this research has employed one of two 
theoretical viewpoints (i.e. upper echelons theory or agency theory) although few studies 
have utilized the two in concert (Hambrick, 2007).  This dissertation draws upon both 
viewpoints to investigate how the individual characteristics of executives moderate the 
relationships between long-term compensation structure and strategic change.  Although 
this research ‘failed’ to support the hypothesized relationships, it is nonetheless a small 
step in the search to understand how executives affect the behavior of their organizations.  
For as Thomas Edison noted in reference to his many ‘failed’ attempts at invention:   
If I find 10,000 ways something won't work, I haven't failed. I am not 
discouraged, because every wrong attempt discarded is another step 
forward. 
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